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INTRODUCTION
How should the international labor regime be reformed in order to
guarantee all workers around the world minimum labor standards?1 This
is the central question we address in this Article. It has been weighed and
discussed by social scientists, legal scholars, and philosophers, who analyze
it from various economic, political, and legal perspectives. Yet interest-
ingly, the literature in this field has been, by and large, characterized by a
sharp disciplinary divide: on the one hand, labor law scholars typically ad-
dress the issue of international labor standards from a detailed practical
perspective, defining the problems in terms of enforcement, efficacy, or
other institutional and procedural obstacles to the effective implementa-
tion of existing regulations.2 In their work, they generally neglect an analy-
sis of the normative aspect of the institutions they discuss. On the other
hand, the few philosophers and political theorists who focus on a philo-
1. By minimum labor standards, we refer to the worldwide consensus elaborated on
in the Article, which can include the four core labor rights recognized by the International
Labour Organization (ILO) in addition to some level of minimum wage and health and
safety protection. The ILO four core rights include (1) “freedom of association and the effec-
tive recognition of the right to collective bargaining”; (2) “elimination of all forms of forced
or compulsory labour”; (3) “effective abolishment of child labour”; (4) “elimination of dis-
crimination in respect of employment and occupation.” Int’l Labor Conference, 86th Sess.,
Geneva, Switz., ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Fol-
low Up, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1237, 1237-38 (1998) (annex revised June 15, 2010) [herein-
after ILO Declaration], available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/
textdeclaration/lang—en/index.htm.
2. See, e.g., KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STAN-
DARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 5-6 (2003); CHRISTINE KAUFMAN, GLOBALIZA-
TION AND LABOUR RIGHTS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CORE LABOUR RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 5 (2007); Philip Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the
Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457 (2004);
Philip Alston, Facing up to the Complexities of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards Agenda, 16
EUR. J. INT’L L. 467, 472 (2005); Kevin Banks, Trade, Labor and International Governance:
An Inquiry into the Potential Effectiveness of the New International Labor Law, 32 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 45, 49 (2011); Andreas Bieler, Ingemar Lindberg & Devan Pillay, The
Future of the Global Working Class: An Introduction, in LABOUR AND THE CHALLENGES OF
GLOBALIZATION: WHAT PROSPECTS FOR TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY? 1, 1, 10 (Andreas
Bieler et al. eds., 2008); Brian A. Langille, Core Labour Rights – The True Story (Reply to
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sophical analysis of global labor rights often fail to take into account the
practical legal details of international labor law.3
In this Article, we seek to bridge this interdisciplinary gap between
the philosophical-normative and empirical-legalistic analytical frameworks
of international labor standards. More specifically, this Article proposes a
new understanding of responsibility to be adopted by the primary interna-
tional organization that was established in 1919 for the purpose of promot-
ing labor rights on the global level—the International Labour
Organization (ILO). The Article also proposes a set of corresponding re-
forms that will adapt the ILO to the unique challenges it is facing in the
twenty-first century. In contrast to earlier legal studies of the ILO, which
have focused on questions of its efficacy,4 institutional structure,5 or inter-
nal politics,6 the reforms we suggest in this Article are based on a multidis-
ciplinary approach that draws from a philosophical analysis of theories of
global justice.
Our chief claim is that a very central yet seemingly unnoticed obstacle
to the realization of the ILO’s goals in the era of globalization stems from
the Organization’s continued espousal of a statist conception of responsi-
3. See, e.g., RICHARD W. MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE ETHICS OF POVERTY
AND POWER 60-62 (2010); Lea Ypi, On the Confusion Between Ideal and Non-Ideal in Recent
Debates on Global Justice, 58 POL. STUD. 536, 536-37 (2010); Iris Marion Young, Responsibil-
ity and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2006, at 102, 119.
4. For a discussion of the efficacy of the ILO’s supervisory system, in particular, see,
for example, LARS THOMANN, STEPS TO COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STAN-
DARDS 62 (2011); Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour
Organization, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 580,
580-81 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); Virginia A. Leary, The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22, 41
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996); Francis Maupain, International Labor
Organization: Recommendations and Similar Instruments, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLI-
ANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMAS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 372,
372 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Francis Maupain, Is the ILO Effective in Upholding Workers’
Rights?: Reflections on the Myanmar Experience, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 85,
85 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Jill Murray, Taking Social Rights Seriously? Is There a Case for
Institutional Reform of the ILO?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK 359, 359-61 (Colin Fenwick &
Tonia Novitz eds., 2010). For a discussion of the efficacy of the ILO from a game theory
perspective, see Alan Hyde, The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for
Global Labor Rights, 3 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 154, 154 (2009).
5. For criticism of the structure of the ILO norm-generation system, see, for example,
Faina Milman-Sivan, The Virtuous Cycle: A New Paradigm for Democratizing Global Gov-
ernance Through Deliberation, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 801, 810-19 (2009) (criticizing
the current ILO structure’s inability to effectively represent diverse interests). For general
criticism of the ineffective methods of the ILO, see BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND
GLOBAL TRADE 66 (2005).
6. For criticism regarding the sharp drop in the rate of ratification of ILO conven-
tions, see, for example, Breen Creighton, The Future of Labour Law: Is There a Role for
International Labour Standards?, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 258, 264-65 (Catherine
Barnard et al. eds., 2004); Sean Cooney, Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for
the New International Political Economy, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 365, 371-76 (1999);
Brian A. Langille, The ILO and the New Economy: Recent Developments, 15 INT’L J. COMP.
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bility, which we argue to be outdated and inadequate in the global era.
Underlying the ILO’s structure and enforcement mechanisms, this statist
conception of responsibility holds the nation-state to be the sole or pri-
mary agent bearing responsibility toward workers within the member
states’ jurisdiction.7 This conception generally focuses on the state as the
key actor within the ILO in terms of generating and enforcing interna-
tional labor standards (ILS), and thus fails to allocate responsibility to
states for violations that occur beyond their jurisdiction, or to relevant pri-
vate bodies for violations. However, recent economic, political, and legal
transformations in the global labor market have eroded the nation-state’s
capability to regulate and enforce a minimum level of labor standards
without the cooperation of other states, while at the same time empower-
ing private nonstate actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs).
On this background, we propose and develop in this Article an inno-
vative alternative conception of shared responsibility, one that offers both
a theoretical model and a practical foundation for reforming the ILO’s
structure and mechanisms. Under our model, responsibility for remedying
the unjust working conditions in the global labor market should be borne
by a complex set of agents and institutions that take part in global produc-
tion. It is our assertion that the ILO should assign legal responsibility for
unjust working conditions in the global labor market not only to the states
in whose territory violations of labor standards arise, but also to brands
and powerful TNCs. Additionally, under certain circumstances, responsi-
bility should be assigned to the states in whose territory these brands or
the corporation headquarters reside. While we are aware that these pro-
posals might pose conceptual as well as pragmatic and political difficulties,
we show that the “seeds” of these underlying values are already embedded
in existing ILO mechanisms and procedures.
Our argument proceeds in four stages. In Part I, we begin by norma-
tively establishing the need to address the structural disadvantages of
workers in today’s global labor market. This Part draws from recent legal
scholarship on the problem of deterritorializing labor law, as well as from
philosophical discussions on global justice, particularly the problem of
structural injustice characterizing contemporary global institutions. Both
the legalistic and philosophical approaches lead to a similar conclusion:
given the reduced ability of individual states to enforce the widely-agreed-
upon labor standards in a transformed global labor market, a fundamental
structural reform of the international labor regime is required. In taking
up this challenge, we point to the question of responsibility as key to such
7. For the contention that international organizations should reconsider the state-
centric ways in which their norm-generation processes are described, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS xiii (2005). In the context of the ILO,
Bercusson and Estlund have recently pointed out that “most international organizations have
been formed, and continue to function, largely as treaty-based creatures of states. So the
weakness of states has implications, as well, for international organisations . . . .” Brian
Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund, Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation: New Chal-
lenges, New Institutions, in REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALISATION: NEW
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reform, namely: Who should be held responsible for remedying the unjust
conditions of workers in the age of globalization?
As shown in Part II, the statist conception of responsibility has under-
pinned the ILO structure from its very beginning and continues to be
strongly embedded in all of its key organizational institutions. This Part
analyzes in detail the manifestations of this conception in the ILO’s basic
structure, its norm-generating procedures, and particularly its supervisory
system (including the complaints and reporting procedures). As we argue
in Part I, in light of recent global economic developments, the protection
of labor rights on the global level mandates a new conception of responsi-
bility, one that takes into account actors beyond the boundaries of the
nation-state.
The rest of this Article is, accordingly, devoted to presenting this
model of shared responsibility and the institutional arrangements required
within the ILO to implement this conception. Part III begins by laying out
our alternative conception of responsibility: a labor connection model of
shared responsibility. This theoretical model is proposed as a regulatory
ideal, designed to replace the statist conception of responsibility. Ours is
not the first general model of shared responsibility to be proposed in the
legal and philosophical literature in recent years. Other examples include
those developed by Iris Young8 and Margot Salomon.9 Yet in contrast to
earlier models, our model offers a unique and more suitable response to
the reality of the global labor market faced by international labor regula-
tors and enforcement organizations. Our model is grounded on four prin-
ciples for allocating responsibility for workers’ rights amongst the various
actors and institutions that participate in the global labor market, particu-
larly those that participate in global production chains. The four principles
include (1) the connectedness principle, that is, participation is shared ac-
tivity such as production, (2) the capacity principle, which refers to the
individual’s or the institution’s capacity to remedy unjust working condi-
tions, (3) the beneficiary principle, understood in terms of financial profit,
and (4) the contribution principle, which takes into account any conduct
by individuals or institutions that has causal relevance to the unjust condi-
tions of workers. In this Part, we outline and expand on these four princi-
ples and demonstrate their application in global labor law.
Lastly, Part IV suggests some practical measures to be taken within
the ILO in order to implement the regulatory ideal of the labor connection
approach to shared responsibility, addressing in particular the ILO’s su-
pervisory system. We begin by identifying the actors that could be consid-
ered responsible for remedying unjust labor conditions under the four
principles of shared responsibility allocation. We conclude that the ILO
should assign legal responsibility for workers’ rights to key actors that the
8. IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 120-21 (2011); Iris Marion
Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 365, 365-88 (2004); Young,
supra note 3. R
9. MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD
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supervisory system currently ignores: states that are not the territorial
state in which the particular labor rights violation occurs and powerful
TNCs that participate in global production chains. The discussion then
elaborates on the specific changes necessary in the supervisory procedures
and mechanisms in order to enforce labor standards across national bor-
ders. We moreover show that the values underlying the shared responsibil-
ity model are already present in the ILO’s institutional design, in
particular in its supervisory system. The advantages and difficulties
presented by our proposed reforms are also considered and contended
with.
I. GLOBALIZATION, LABOR STANDARDS, AND
BACKGROUND INJUSTICE
In recent years, a growing number of economists have recognized that
globalization—namely, the international integration of markets and goods
that has accelerated since the 1980s—has increased economic insecurity
for workers.10 Economic globalization has enhanced global competition
among states over capital and jobs and, consequentially, has generated a
“race to the bottom” or “regulatory chill” of labor standards in various
sectors, mostly but not exclusively, in developing countries.11 The liberali-
zation of trade and greater global integration have translated into compet-
itive pressure on individual states and have facilitated the entry of new
actors into the global labor market. Such new actors are mainly TNCs,
which utilize cheap labor forces, particularly in the developing world, in
order to produce products and services that serve mostly members of de-
veloped states. Interstate competition over foreign investment and the in-
ternationalization of production chains have reduced the will of national
governments to enforce labor regulations.12 In developed states, hyper-
globalization has resulted in greater insecurity for working people and an
ever-increasing income gap among workers, as well as between workers
and management or investors.13
Consequently, in the current global economy, only a minority of the
world’s working people hold jobs that are well paid, where their funda-
mental rights are respected, and that ensure them some security in the
event of job loss, personal or family illness, or other crises.14 The dire
working conditions in sweatshops, particularly for women and in develop-
10. DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE
OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 86-87 (2011).
11. See, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], International Trade and Core
Labour Standards, at 39-42 (Oct. 10, 2000); Robert J. Flanagan, International Labor Stan-
dards and Decent Work: Perspectives from the Developing World, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS 16 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
12. See e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and ‘Fair Trade’ Demands: Ad-
dressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 6 WORLD ECON. 745, 755 (1995).
See generally RODRIK, supra note 10, at 86-87. R
13. RODRIK, supra note 10, at 86-87. R
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ing countries, have been described and acknowledged in numerous stud-
ies.15 Many of these production workers are employed under devastating
conditions, working unrestricted hours and lacking the most minimum
safety and health conditions.16 Indeed, the scope of the problem is appal-
ling. In 2011, 30% of the world’s workforce—more than 910 million work-
ers—earned less than $2 a day, which is defined as the global poverty line,
and an estimated 456 million workers (14.8% of the world’s workforce)
earned less than $1.25 a day, which is defined as the extreme poverty
line.17 In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, around four-fifths of the
employed are classified as “working poor.”18 The lack of labor standards is
most common in—but not limited to—developing regions.19 The 2008 ec-
onomic crisis demonstrated that sizeable economic sectors are equally vul-
15. For a few examples, see JILL ESBENSHADE, MONITORING SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS,
CONSUMERS AND THE GLOBAL APPAREL INDUSTRY 4 (2004); PIETRA RIVOLI, THE TRAVELS
OF A T-SHIRT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIST EXAMINES THE MARKETS, POWER,
AND POLITICS OF WORLD TRADE 89 (2d ed., 2009); THE SWEATSHOP QUANDARY: CORPO-
RATE RESPONSIBILITY ON THE GLOBAL FRONTIER 66-68 (Pamela Varley ed., 1998); Denis G.
Arnold, Working Conditions: Safety and Sweatshops, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSI-
NESS ETHICS 628, 629 (George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 2010); Denis G.
Arnold & Norman E. Bowie, Sweatshops and Respect for Persons, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 221,
231-33 (2003).
16. Further, it is estimated that currently 20.9 million persons are the victims of forced
labor worldwide. ILO, 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology, at
11 (June 1, 2012) [hereinafter ILO 2012 Global Estimate], available at http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf. As
of 2007, the U.N. estimated that about 2.5 million forced labor victims are trafficked. U.N.
Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, Human Trafficking: The Facts (2007), available
at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/Forced_labour/HUMAN_TRAF
FICKING_-_THE_FACTS_-_final.pdf (citing a 2007 ILO study); see also ILO, Every Child
Counts: New Global Estimates on Child Labour, at 25-26 (2002) (estimating that 1.2 million
children are trafficked worldwide); UNICEF, U.K., Child Trafficking Information Sheet
(2006) (discussing the nature of child trafficking both in the United Kingdom and
worldwide).
About 22% of the trafficked victims are used for forced sexual exploitation, and 98% are
women. ILO Global Estimate, supra, at 14.
17. Global Employment Trends 2011, supra note 14, at 71. R
18. Id.
19. It is estimated that the majority of workers in the world today work in the informal
economy, with most of those workers coming from developing countries. KAUFMAN, supra
note 2. Within the informal economy, atypical employment includes a wide range of working R
conditions, from the relatively mild harms of low wages and unsteady job security, to condi-
tions of extreme exploitation, slavery, and abuse. Atypical or nonstandard work is prevalent,
although less salient, in developed countries as well. For example, this accounts for 25% of
the workforce in the United States. Atypical jobs are usually taken on by the most vulnerable
social groups, including migrants, minorities, women, and children. Bieler, Lindberg & Pillay,
supra note 2, at 1, 10. Women consistently receive lower wages, as they often work in segre- R
gated sectors that are generally characterized by low pay, long hours, and oftentimes infor-
mal working arrangements. ILO, Women in Labour Markets: Measuring Progress and
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nerable to economic shock, further diminishing any hope for the
implementation of decent work conditions.20
Drawing from recent philosophical theories of global justice, as well as
from contemporary legal discussions on the deterritorialization of labor
law, in this Part we argue that the structural advantages of workers in the
emerging global economy require a fundamental reform of the interna-
tional labor regime. In what follows we first elaborate on the existing gap
between, on the one hand, the exploitive working conditions in today’s
global labor market and on the other hand, the emerging international
consensus regarding the need to protect minimum labor standards. We
then present two approaches in current literature that aimed at explaining
this gap and proposed ways to minimize it: the empirical-legalistic discus-
sion on the problem of deterritorializing labor law and the normative-phil-
osophical discussion on the theories of background injustice. We conclude
this Part by calling for an alternative approach that combines both the
legalistic and normative perspectives and pays particular attention to the
concept of responsibility as key to addressing the erosion of labor stan-
dards despite growing international consensus regarding their content.
Our main argument is that the failure to protect labor standards for work-
ers in the global labor market stems from, among other things, the out-
dated conception of responsibility that underpins the current international
labor regime.
A. The Gap
From a philosophical-normative perspective, the abysmal working
conditions across the world are generally described as exploitative and un-
just. The exploitation of workers in the global labor market can occur on
two different levels. First is the interactional level, namely, in the interac-
tion among various actors within global chains of production (for example,
brands, subcontractors, and workers). On this level, procedural philosoph-
ical theories of exploitation consider workers to be exploited by their em-
ployers even if they (the workers) voluntarily consent to terms of
employment that fail to provide minimum labor conditions. Employment
contracts are considered to be exploitative if the workers’ ability to bar-
gain and disagree with the terms of the contract was limited during the
negotiations phase.21 This limitation often stems from the asymmetry of
power between workers and employers and is common in negotiations
that take place on an individual, rather than collective, basis. From this
procedural point of view, employment contracts can be regarded as exploi-
tive and, thus, unjust, even if they benefit the workers.
The fact that workers may benefit from their work arrangements, rela-
tive to alternative options (for example, unemployment or worse working
20. See World Trade Organization [WTO] & ILO, Globalization and Informal Jobs in
Developing Countries, at 10 (2009).
21. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 60-62; Chris Meyers, Wrongful Beneficence: Exploita- R
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conditions at other places of employment) does not diminish the exploitive
nature of the labor relations. This is because the exploitation arises when
the employer takes advantage of a worker’s bargaining weakness, given
the latter’s desperate neediness, especially under the existing economic
conditions of developing countries. This exploitation occurs regardless of
the benefits the working agreement may yield for the worker, and regard-
less of the worker’s voluntary consent.22
Second, exploitation of workers in the global labor market occurs on
an institutional level, namely, in existing regulations of the global economy
that have been determined by global institutions (for example, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization
(WTO)) or through intergovernmental agreements. This is particularly the
case in the manufacturing sector in developing states, where exploitation
of workers has been intensified by the processes of economic globaliza-
tion. The disadvantage of workers in the developing world stems partly
from unequal global trade and investment framework agreements between
developing and developed countries. One example of such an imbalance in
negotiating power is the Uruguay Round, which was administered by the
WTO from 1981 to 1994 between developed and developing states. During
the negotiations, the former took advantage of the latter’s urgent need for
access to developed markets.23 One of the consequences of these agree-
ments is the deepening of the imbalance between the heightened mobility
allowed for capital and goods and the restricted mobility of workers
caused by immigration rules and other economic and cultural constraints.
As economist Prakash Sethi argues, this imbalance between the mobility
of capital and that of labor violates standard trade theory, which requires
maximum mobility of both to enable equitable distribution of benefits
from free trade. In the global economy, he asserts, only TNCs enjoy all of
22. According to this procedural conception of exploitation, exploitation may occur
even if the exploited person benefits as a result of the interaction between the two parties. A
common example is that of a man lost in a desert, about to die of thirst, when another man
on a camel appears and convinces the thirsty man to lead him to a well in return for life-long
servitude in the camel rider’s household. Although the thirsty man benefited from the agree-
ment, the camel rider has exploited the thirsty man since he took advantage of the latter’s
needs, benefiting from his inferior capacity to pursue his interests. See MILLER, supra note 3, R
at 66; Meyers, supra note 21. For Marxist interpretations of exploitation, see, for example, R
G.A. Cohen, The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation, 8 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 338, 341-42 (1979); John E, Roemer, Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 30, 31 (1985). For additional understandings of exploitation in different
contexts, see RUTH J. SAMPLE, EXPLOITATION: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT’S WRONG 11 (2003);
ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996); Avner de-Shalit, Transnational and International
Exploitation, 46 POL. STUD. 693, 698 (1998); Kai Nielsen & Robert Ware, Introduction: What
Exploitation Comes To, in EXPLOITATION (Kai Nielsen & Robert Ware, eds., 1997); Andrew
Reeve, Thomas Hodgskin and John Bray: Free Exchange and Equal Exchange, in MODERN
THEORIES OF EXPLOITATION (Andrew Reeves ed., 1987); Jeremy Snyder, Exploitation and
Sweatshop Labor: Perspectives and Issues, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 187, 188 (2010).
23. For a more radical approach to structural exploitation of workers in the capitalist
system, see Lea Ypi, On the Confusion between Ideal and Non Ideal Recent Debates on
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the advantages of moving capital between different sectors and nations in
order to maximize their return on investments, whereas workers lack this
mobility. Workers cannot migrate easily, if at all, to countries with labor
shortages, and consequently, they are prevented from eliminating ineffi-
ciencies in the labor market.24 Such conditions, Sethi claims, “are more
characteristic of neo-mercantilism than of truly free markets.”25
While the exploitative conditions of workers around the world persist
on both the institutional and interactional levels, recent decades have seen
the emergence of a worldwide consensus regarding the need to legally
guarantee some minimal level of labor norms and basic rights for workers.
Despite the great variety of welfare and labor regimes that have devel-
oped in different modern industrial democracies,26 there are significant
similarities in their labor regulations with regard to minimal work condi-
tions. Indeed, most states currently guarantee comparable basic norms,
such as a weekly day of rest, paid sick leave, paid annual leave, and wage
premiums for mandatory overtime.27 At the international level, recogni-
tion of the need to ensure some minimal labor standards is manifested in
several key documents of international human rights law.28 One of the
clearest expressions of this global consensus is the ILO 1998 Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work, which defined four core
basic labor rights: the right to be free of forced or compulsory labor, the
right of children not to work, the right to be free of discrimination in em-
24. S. Pratash Sethi, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Success of Globalization,
ETHICS & INT’L AFF., Mar. 2002, at 89, 90 .
25. Id. at 90-91. According to Sethi,
[TNCs] use both the fact and threat of capital mobility to extract maximum pro-
ductivity gains from cheap and abundant labor. The control of overseas markets
provides the [TNCs] with monopoly-like power, which they use on local manufac-
turers to extract the lowest prices possible and thus put extreme downward pres-
sure on local wage rates. Local manufacturers, in their turn, cooperate among
themselves by not competing for workers on the basis of higher wages—a situation
that is easily maintained because of abundant labor.
Id. at 91.
26. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 1 (1990).
27. JODY HEYMANN & ALISON EARLE, RAISING THE GLOBAL FLOOR: DISMANTLING
THE MYTH THAT WE CAN’T AFFORD GOOD WORKING CONDITIONS FOR EVERYONE 101-05
(2010). Clearly not all states live up to their international legal commitments, nor do they
always enforce existing national labor laws. Nevertheless, the consensus regarding essential
labor standards that constitute an acceptable floor for decent working conditions is shared by
many societies regardless of their cultural characteristics or their level of economic develop-
ment. See id.
28. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3; ILO Declaration, supra note 1; Universal R
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948). For the Global Compact, see About Us: The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL
COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last
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ployment and occupation, and the right to freedom of expression and col-
lective bargaining.29 In 2008, the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for
Fair Globalization expanded this scope of protection to include three addi-
tional strategic objectives to be adopted by the member states: promoting
access for all to freely chosen employment; developing measures of social
security and labor protection such as basic healthcare (for example, mater-
nity leave), safety regulations at work, and minimum wage; and promoting
social dialogue among workers, employers, and the state.30
How can this gap between the broad consensus on labor standards on
the one hand, and the pitiful labor conditions in the global labor market
on the other, be explained? And how can this gap be closed? This puzzle is
usually addressed in labor law scholarship in empirical-legalistic terms. La-
bor law scholars have argued that the transformation of the global labor
market, compounded by the state’s decreasing capability to regulate and
enforce labor standards, has led to a need to deterritorialize labor law.
Alternatively, recent philosophical scholarship has described the problem
of diminished global labor standards in normative terms as the problem of
background injustice, thus implying a need for comprehensive institutional
redesign across the global labor market. Both the empirical-legalistic ex-
planation and the philosophical explanation for this deterioration in stan-
dards will be presented in the next two Sections.
B. The Deterritorialization of Labor Law
In recent years, a number of labor law scholars have acknowledged a
growing inadequacy between the existing system of national and interna-
tional regulation of labor law and the increasing obstacles to enforcing
labor standards in the global labor market. National labor regulations,
which have developed gradually since the early days of the industrial
revolution, helped balance the inherently asymmetrical relations between
employers and employees within the national labor market. Yet the legal
and political tools that traditionally guaranteed labor standards in nation-
states were territorial in nature, and thus emerge as limited in the global
labor context. Traditional labor law, which was developed, by and large, as
a domestic project and was generally administered on a territorial basis,
seems insufficient for resolving the imbalance between labor and capital in
the global labor market, resulting from, among other factors, the interna-
29. ILO Declaration, supra note 1. R
30. Int’l Labour Conf., 97th Sess., ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Global-
ization, at 9-11 (June 10, 2008) [hereinafter ILO Declaration on Social Justice], available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-dgreports/-cabinet/documents/genericdocument/
wcms_099766.pdf. This Declaration introduced the ILO Decent Work agenda. Id. at 1. The
legal status of the Declaration is ambiguous and demonstrates varying degrees of states’ com-
mitment toward this seeming consensus on labor rights. Some provisions are of a declaratory
nature while others have stronger legal implications. See Francis Maupain, New Foundation
or New Façade? The ILO and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization,
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tionalization of production chains and the growing number of migrant and
offshoring workers.31
Transnational corporations exemplify the current inadequacy of legal
protection of labor rights globally.32 Whereas their headquarters are gen-
erally based in developed countries, the labor force that produces their
products and services is usually located in the developing world. From a
legal point of view, TNCs are not connected to the workers who produce
their products through employment contracts but, rather, through contrac-
tual obligations within the global production chains. Locally, workers in
global production chains are often employed indirectly by manpower
agencies, contractors, or subcontractors or else are legally considered to be
self-employed despite their economic dependence on the supplier. Legally,
then, TNCs are not considered “employers” of these workers and, thus,
bear no legal responsibility for their labor conditions or well-being.33
The difficulty with deterritorializing labor law relates not only to the
global emergence of TNCs; it also involves issues relating to, for example,
migrant workers, who, in some cases are not fully protected by national
labor law because they are not citizens.34 However, for the purposes of
simplicity in this Article, we will not expand on these and other related
issues.
C. The Problem of Background Injustice
From a normative point of view, the failure to guarantee workers in
the global labor market a minimum of labor standards and to prevent their
exploitation on both the interactional and institutional levels constitutes
31. Guy Mundlak, De-Territorializing Labor Law, 3 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 1
(2009).
32. Our argument here concerns the constraint on labor law, and we refrain from the
more general debate of whether market power has indeed transcended the power of the state
more generally. See, e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE 29-30 (1996).
33. For example, in the apparel industry, some women are required to produce sec-
tions of future assembled clothing in their homes and, thus, are regarded to be self-employed
and not employees of the subcontractors who sell the products to the brands. Julie Dela-
hanty, A Common Thread: Issues for Women Workers in the Garment Sector, WOMEN IN
INFORMAL EMP.: GLOBALIZING & ORGANIZING (May 17, 1999), http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/1999-A-Common-Thread-Issues-for-Women-Workers-in-the-Gar-
ment-Sector.pdf; Garment Workers, WOMEN IN INFORMAL EMP.: GLOBALIZING & ORGANIZ-
ING, http://wiego.org/informal-economy/occupational-groups/garment-workers (last visited
Mar. 26, 2013).
34. The ILO’s International Labor Migration Survey showed that in fewer than half
the countries surveyed, national legislation provided for any protection against discrimina-
tion at work. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia exclude all migrant workers from national social and
labor laws. See Stephanie Grant, International Migration and Human Rights (Pol’y Analysis
& Res. Programme of the Global Comm’n on Int’l Migration, Sept. 2005), available at http://
www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/
gcim/tp/TP7.pdf; see also Office of the U.N. High Comm’nr for Hum. Rts., Migration and
Development: a Human Rights Approach, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
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conditions of what John Rawls termed background injustice. Background
injustice is defined by Rawls as the absence of just rules as well as political
and social institutions that constrain people’s decisions and actions.35 In
the absence of a “just background,” the accumulated results of many sepa-
rate and fair agreements between individuals can, over the course of time,
lead to a situation whereby conditions of free and fair agreements no
longer hold.36 This may be due to social trends and historical
contingencies.37
Rawls limited the scope of the principles of justice to the state level,
namely, to those people who live under the same basic structure. How-
ever, in recent, separate publications, Miriam Ronzoni and Arash
Abizadeh drew on Rawls’s underlying assumptions to derive cosmopolitan
conclusions, arguing that the existence of background injustice on the
global level mandates the establishment of institutions and rules that cor-
rect the unjust reality.38 According to Ronzoni, if problems of background
injustice arise on the global level, we have a duty to alter the global institu-
tional structure in order to end the conditions of injustice.39 Some of these
institutions may be completely new and different from the institutional
arrangements that underlie the basic structure of the nation-state, yet they
do not necessarily need to create a world-state.40 Abizadeh reached a con-
curring conclusion based on his analysis of Rawls’s notion of “fair terms of
cooperation.” According to Abizadeh, when a group of individuals are en-
gaged in a mutually advantageous enterprise, the creation of a basic struc-
ture is required to realize just background conditions.41
The background injustice argument is particularly germane to
problems of global labor. In a brief comment, Rawls used the example of
labor contracts to support his claim regarding the role of sociopolitical in-
stitutions in securing just background conditions.
[W]hether wage agreements are fair rests, for example, on the na-
ture of the labor market: excess market power must be prevented
and fair bargaining power should obtain between employers and
employees. But, in addition, fairness depends on the underlying
social conditions, such as fair opportunity, extending backward in
time and well beyond any limited view.42
35. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 265-66 (1993).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Arash Abizadeh, Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not
Site) of Distributive Justice, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 318, 329 (2007); Miriam Ronzoni, The
Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account, 37 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 229, 230, 245 (2009).
39. Ronzoni, supra note 38, at 230, 245. R
40. Id. at 245.
41. Abizadeh, supra note 38, at 329. R
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In a different article, we have argued that the reality of background
injustice in the global labor market mandates the implementation of prin-
ciples of justice in the global sphere.43 This is so because the unjust nature
of the existing regulation of labor on the global level undermines the very
aims and justifications that characterize labor law. In other words, consid-
erations of justice require either that new institutions and rules be created
or else that existing global institutions be reinforced to correct the unjust
conditions of global labor.
D. A New Conception of Responsibility
Although it is clear that labor conditions in the age of globalization
require a fundamental structural reform of the international labor regime
in order to provide workers around the world with some minimal level of
labor standards, what is missing in the discussions described above is the
idea of responsibility, which is key to ensuring the effective regulation and
enforcement of labor standards. In other words, who should be held re-
sponsible for remedying unjust working conditions and enforcing labor
rights beyond the borders of the nation-state?
As discussed above, there is already global consensus on the need to
ensure a minimum level of labor standards. Yet the nation-state, tradition-
ally the central bearer of responsibility for workers’ rights, is no longer
adequately equipped for the task in the reality of the global labor market.
Until recently, the nation-state was considered the primary agent responsi-
ble for legislating and enforcing the labor standards applied within its
boundaries. But with the global expansion of production and services, the
state’s ability (and will) to protect workers’ rights on the national level has
been undermined. Hence, a new conception of responsibility, one that
takes into account actors beyond a nation-state’s boundaries, must be de-
veloped to address the contemporary difficulties faced by international in-
stitutions in applying labor standards globally. Given these obstacles, the
question of responsibility is particularly acute.
The reduced ability of individual states to enforce labor standards in
the global labor market has created two main challenges for international
labor. The first challenge is to develop a new paradigm of shared responsi-
bility that is better suited to the contemporary global economy. By
“shared responsibility” we mean that the responsibility to rectify unjust
labor conditions does not reside with only one particular actor or institu-
tion, but rather is shared by various actors or institutions. Moreover,
“shared responsibility” implies that the responsibility to promote labor
standards is not limited to the territory of a particular state. In other
words, responsibility for a violation of workers’ rights in a particular state
can be borne by actors or institutions external to that state, or even by
other states.44 In Part III, we put forth our conception of shared responsi-
43. Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner & Faina Milman-Sivan, Global Labor Rights as Du-
ties of Justice 28 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
44. This notion is recognized in the realm of the general protection of human rights.
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bility, which is more cosmopolitan in nature than the conception of re-
sponsibility guiding the current international labor regime.
The second challenge faced by international labor is to devise institu-
tional arrangements for implementing the shared responsibility conception
and allocating responsibility to the various actors in the global labor mar-
ket so as to guarantee basic labor standards for all workers across the
world. In Part IV, we tackle this challenge and propose guidelines for re-
forms in the supervisory mechanisms of the ILO.45
First, however, Part II will demonstrate how the ILO’s structure and,
in particular, its enforcement mechanisms are based on an archaic, statist
conception of responsibility that is no longer suited to the global economic
and political reality.
II. THE ILO: A STATIST MODEL OF RESPONSIBILITY
An underlying premise of the ILO’s norm-generating and monitoring
procedures is that the nation-state is the basic unit of deliberation and
decision-making. As will be demonstrated below, this is reflected in all of
the ILO’s key organizational institutions. Under the statist model, legally,
states are the key actors responsible for and benefactors of implementing
workers’ rights. The uniquely daring features of the ILO—the most salient
of which are its unique tripartite structure and its original integrative, in-
ternationalist economic vision—have done little to alter the dominance of
the statist model.
In this Part, following a brief historical introduction, we present the
manifestations of the statist model of responsibility in the key ILO opera-
tional functions, with a focus on the supervisory mechanism.
111 YALE L.J. 443, 461 (2001) (“[A] system in which the state is the sole target of interna-
tional legal obligations may not be sufficient to protect human rights.”).
45. To be clear, the guidelines we propose in Part IV for reforming the ILO are not
presented as a remedy for all aspects of background injustice in the global labor market. A
comprehensive reform addressing the entire spectrum of existing unjust institutions and prac-
tices in international labor would require changes on both the institutional and interactional
levels. On the institutional level, a comprehensive reform should include the redesign of
global institutions, such as the WTO and European Union, and intergovernmental labor
agreements. One interesting example of such a reform is the Barry & Reddy proposal for
establishing a global linkage between labor standards and trade agreements. CHRISTIAN
BARRY & SANJAY G. REDDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LABOR STANDARDS: A PROPO-
SAL FOR LINKAGE, 1, 27–29 (2008). Another proposed institutional reform has been put forth
by Margot Salomon, which is discussed in Part III. See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying R
text. On the interactional level, a different approach to ameliorating background injustice in
international labor may be prompted by pressure from civil society, as proposed by Fung,
O’Rourke, and Sabel, ARCHON FUNG, DARA O’ROURKE & CHARLES SABEL, CAN WE PUT
AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 4 (2001), and by Iris Young, Young, Responsibility and Global
Labor Justice supra note 8, at 375–82; infra notes 161-171 and accompanying text. While we R
acknowledge that multitiered reform is necessary to effectively address injustices on both the
interactional and institutional levels, in this Article, we focus on the application of a new
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A. The Statist Model: A Historical Perspective
The ILO was established in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles,46
and its constitution was drafted when the concept of state sovereignty was
the unchallenged premise of international law.47 Consequently, the statist
model is predominant in the ILO’s structure as a whole, as well as its su-
pervisory system, which is at the heart of the discussion in this Part.
At its inception, the ILO aspired to promote universal values and the
harmonization of labor norms across borders. This explicit goal of “univer-
sality” was expressed first in the ILO’s tripartite structure, under which
nongovernmental delegates of employers and employees were granted for-
mal voting power in the organization. Thus, each member state in the ILO
was represented by delegates representing three constituents: workers,
employers, and government.48 This enabled the forging of cross-border al-
liances between workers or between employee organizations.49 Second,
from the outset and through the period between the two world wars, the
ILO generally tended to adopt an outlook that underscored common
global responsibility for workers by linking international economic policy
with social policy. This integrative and internationalist approach50 had the
potential to lead the ILO away from the statist model. It stressed the ob-
jective of preventing unfair trade and the “race to the bottom” in lowering
labor standards to attract capital, as well as the eventual aspiration to pro-
mote social justice and world peace.51 Indeed, the horrific work conditions
of laborers in the period preceding World War I, caused by fierce unregu-
lated economic competition, were understood to be a significant factor in
the outbreak of the war.52 The creation of cross-border unified labor stan-
dards via cooperation among states was suggested as an appropriate re-
46. Origins and History, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang—en/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
47. The literature on the idea of sovereignty in international law is too vast to review
here. For some recent examples of this scholarship, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–33 (2d ed. 2006); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMMI, THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (2011); SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION (Neil Walker ed.,
2003); Jean L. Cohen, Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutionalist Plural-
ist Perspective, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 31, 32 (1995-1996); Guglielmo Verdirame, A Normative Theory of Sovereignty
Transfer, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 371 (2013). For a more historical perspective on the concept of
the sovereign state, see Quentin Skinner, The Sovereign State: A Genealogy, in SOVEREIGNTY
IN FRAGMENTS: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT 26 (Hent
Kalmo & Quentin Skinner eds., 2010).
48. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, art. 7, June 28, 1919, 49
Stat. 2712, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter ILO Constitution].
49. For a recent historic overview, see GERRY RODGERS ET AL., THE ILO AND THE
QUEST FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1919-2009 5-6 (2009).
50. Id. at 206-09.
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sponse to these conditions.53 The ILO thus did not merely aim to prevent
a race to the bottom, but explicitly strived toward enhancing social justice
through a race to the top, envisaging a slow rise in labor standards over
time.
Yet, these universalist and internationalist ambitions were curtailed
from the very start. To begin with, the ILO’s structure was limited to rep-
resentatives of workers, employers, and the government of each state, de-
nying formal representation to groups such as women workers and
migrant workers, for example.54 Furthermore, norm-generation and moni-
toring procedures continued, to a large extent, to follow the basic statist
model, as will be shown below.55 Moreover, the notion of universality was
very narrow, as harmonization of norms was confined to the limited geo-
graphical scope of the industrialized states. In its original constitution, the
ILO not only refrained from requiring member states to apply or monitor
ratified norms beyond their territorial borders, but also exempted indus-
trial states from applying those norms to territories within their control,
that is, to “non-metropolitan territories”—their colonies, for example.56
The post-World War II period saw an entrenchment of the statist
model. The Philadelphia Declaration, produced in 1944 and incorporated
in the ILO Constitution, broke from the ILO’s previous colonial orienta-
tion and, for the first time, declared equal rights for all.57 The ILO now
explicitly tied economic and social development to basic human rights.
The focus on human rights generated the now-traditional understanding
that states are to be held responsible for enforcing human rights. This co-
incided with the ILO’s gradual shift away from an internationalist eco-
nomic vision during the same period.58 The ILO increasingly began to
engage in national planning for industrialization, as the “prevailing eco-
nomic model was concerned with the national economy.”59 In 1946, the
ILO became a specialized agency of the United Nations, as a component
of the Bretton Woods global order, and embraced the statist logic that
underlay the Bretton Woods structure. The prevailing economic model of
the time was a blueprint of the welfare state, designed to ensure fair redis-
53. Id.
54. See Abdul-Karim Tikriti, Tripartism and The International Labour Organisation: A
Study of The Legal Concept: Its Origins, Function, and Evolution in the Law Of Nations, in 7
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (1982) (arguing that the true meaning of the tripartite
principle was defined in terms of Western capitalistic societies, where a clear distinction exists
between employers, workers and governments).
55. See infra Part II.B.
56. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 49, at 42. R
57. The Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the ILO is usually referred
to as the Philadelphia Declaration. The declaration now constitutes an annex to the ILO
Constitution as amended in 1946. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, annex. R
58. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 49, at 210-11. R
59. The promotion of social and labor rights was linked to the national economic
scheme for promoting national growth. The principal ILO contribution to the UN Interna-
tional Development Strategy addressed national strategies for employment until the year
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tribution within state borders.60 In the postwar years, the Cold War hin-
dered any possibility of departing from statism, as the “East” now also
adhered to the notion of the state as supervisor of most aspects of the
economic structure.
It was not until the 1990s that the ILO invested in developing policies
that addressed cross-border subject matter.61 The first WTO ministerial
meeting in Singapore in 1996, denying the WTO’s own responsibility for
enacting a social clause,62 assigned the duty to promote core labor stan-
dards to the ILO.63 The ILO’s 1998 Declaration was created partly in re-
sponse to this challenge, marking its deeper involvement in international
social policy.64 In its comprehensive 2004 Fair Globalization Report, as
well as its 2008 Declaration, the ILO recognized the specific need to tackle
the challenges of globalization, proposing a mix of measures on the na-
tional and international levels.65 Even these two landmark instruments,
however, failed to substantially test the underlying state-based structure of
the ILO.66 Little has changed since in terms of the ILO’s governance
structure and conception of responsibility. We will show this below, in a
brief overview of the ILO’s governance structure and its ingrained statist
approach. We begin with a description of the tripartite structure and the
60. Ethan B. Kapstein, Workers and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
1996, at 16, 20. Following WWII, the international community, in particular Western Indus-
trial Countries, gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 12, 1944, in order to
design a new international monitory order. The principle Bretton Woods institutions were
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (the World Bank). Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; Bretton Woods Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Banks for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat.
1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
61. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 49, at 213-22. R
62. The movement to anchor labor and environmental interests in a social clause
within the WTO—bursting into public consciousness in the Seattle demonstrations of 1999—
was joined by academics, including prominent economist Joseph Stiglitz, for example, who
advocated incorporating ILO’s concerns into other international economic institutions, such
as the IMF and the World Bank. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Development, in TAM-
ING GLOBALIZATION 47, 65 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003); see gener-
ally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 395-463 (2d ed. 1999).
63. For a sample of the literature regarding trade-labor linkage debate see, for exam-
ple, L. Alan Winters, Commentary, Trade and LABOR Standards: To Link or Not to Link?, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY OPTIONS 309
(Kaushik Basu et al. eds., 2003).
64. See, e.g., Bob Hepple, The WTO as a Mechanism for Labour Regulation, in REGU-
LATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALIZATION 161, 171 (Brian Bercusson & Cynthia
Estlund eds., 2008).
65. ILO Declaration on Social Justice, supra note 30; ILO Declaration, supra note 1; R
ILO, World Comm’n on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creat-
ing Opportunities for All (Feb. 2004).
66. Christien Van Den Anker, Cosmopolitan Justice and the Globalization of Capital-
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process of generating and adopting ILS and then elaborate on the supervi-
sory system that ensures ILS compliance.
B. The Statist Model and the ILO’s Organizational Structure
1. Tripartism
The ILO is the only international institution to depart from the con-
ventional structure whereby states alone can be accepted as members in
international organizations.67 Instead, the ILO embraced a distinctive par-
ticipatory tripartite structure68 that reflects the importance of consulting
with workers and employers in setting economic policy.69 This basic tripar-
tite structure is replicated in each of the ILO’s component bodies, such as,
the ILO Conference, as described below, the ILO Governing Body, the
executive organ of the ILO, as well as the ILO Office, the secretariat of
the ILO.70 Most of the committees that support the work of the Gov-
erning Body and the Office are also tripartite committees, although expert
committees also exist.
However, the statist model continues to dominate the ILO’s opera-
tion, as the participation of non-governmental interests (namely, the inter-
ests of employers and employees) is channeled through the state. Take, for
example, the structure of the International Labour Conference (the Con-
ference), which is the body that sets the ILO’s broad policies, often re-
ferred to as the ILO parliament. The Conference is comprised of four
representatives from each of the ILO member states, two of whom are
governmental delegates and two nongovernmental delegates, represent-
ing, respectively, the employers and employees of each of the member
67. See How the ILO Works, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-
works/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) (noting its structure “where workers
and employers together have an equal voice with governments in its deliberations”). The
United Nations is the most salient example of such conventional structure of representation.
68. The advantages of the tripartite system go beyond giving voice to and improving
the treatment of the groups represented. They include considerations of efficiency, such as
the need to include in the deliberation people with practical experience on the subject, espe-
cially regarding technical work process. Due in part to the 1997 Asian crisis, a renewed inter-
est in the tripartite approach to problem-solving in the era of globalization seems to be
emerging, based on a rising recognition that a “win-win situation is the ultimate objective of
the partners in the workplace.” Tayo Fashoyin, Industrial Relations in Developing Countries,
in THE ILO AND THE SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY: THE GENEVA LECTURES
31, 42 (Roger Blanpain & Chris Engels eds., 2001). Such an approach raises the following
question: If we concede to enabling representation of groups on the basis of their particular
interests, why should we stop there? Would “identity representation” be more appropriate?
Exploring the parameters of the scope of the “representation debate” is beyond the scope of
this Article, despite the possibility that our conception of the desirable debate may turn on
our view of the decision-making process. For a broad discussion of the representation debate
with reference to the ILO, see generally Milman-Sivan, supra note 5. R
69. The ILO also mostly grants equal weight to each of its member states (the Gov-
erning Body is a notable exception), regardless of wealth and size. See ILO Constitution
supra note 48, arts. 3(1), 4(1). R
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states.71 Although the nongovernmental representatives are appointed by
the member states, the ILO Constitution requires that the appointments
be decided in conjunction with the industrial organizations, which are the
most representative of employers and working people in their countries.72
Regardless of whether the tripartite structure is, as some assert, “a
model for participation in international civil society”73 or, as others sug-
gest, a significantly limited structure,74 for our purposes, it remains statist-
based: each state nominates representatives of its functional interests—
workers and employers—in its territory. In addition, the ILO organiza-
tional structure excludes all interests and functional groups beyond work-
ers and employees.75 Despite its originality and uniqueness, then, the
tripartite structure does not, in and of itself, represent a complete diver-
gence from the statist approach.
2. The Norm-Generating Process and ILS
The ILO’s adherence to the statist model is exemplified in the ILS-
generation process and the nature of those standards.76 ILO standards—
namely, conventions (the primary proclamations of labor standards) and
71. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 3(1). Although the basic structure of repre- R
sentation recognizes only the need for employee and employer representation as groups,
there are some beginnings of recognition in the ILO Constitution regarding the need for
representation beyond that limited scheme. Thus, for example, under article 3(2) of the ILO
Constitution, two advisers, for each item on the agenda of the meeting, may accompany each
delegate; at least one of the advisers should be a woman when questions especially affecting
women are to be deliberated. Id. art. 3(2). This is far from satisfactory for advocates of a
voice for women in the ILO. We draw attention to this fact only to emphasize the existing,
although slim, basis for acceptance of such arguments.
72. Id. art. 3(5). “The credentials of the delegates and their advisers shall be subject to
scrutiny by the Conference, which may, by two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates pre-
sent, refuse to admit any delegate or adviser whom it deems not to have been nominated in
accordance with this article.” Id. art. 3(9).
73. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and Interna-
tional Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 286 (1997).
74. For example, the literature on the ILO has recognized the limitations of the tripar-
tite system with respect to the representativity of the ILO:
This early twentieth-century model, based on the then-industrialized world, has
developed some gaps. Trade unions have searched for—but not yet found—satis-
factory global models for international membership. And nationally based employ-
ers’ organizations cannot adequately represent huge multinational corporations;
nor can they effectively exercise pressure upon them to conform to international
labour standards. Indeed, even the concept of national sovereignty is changing
with institutions such as the European Union, weakening direct government con-
trol over the workplace policies that they are bound to implement.
RODGERS ET AL., supra note 49, at 18; see also Milman-Sivan, supra note 5, at 802–03. R
75. Thus, for example, the interests of migrants, religious groups, women, or agricul-
tural workers could all be considered as candidates for receiving independent representation
in the ILO. For further discussion, see generally Milman-Sivan, supra note 5. R
76. For detailed portrayal of the ILO’s norm generating process, see How Interna-
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recommendations (nonbinding labor standards)—are formulated to create
obligations for member states. States, thus, are the only legal bearers of
responsibility for the violations of labor rights as they are the only actors
expected to ratify and comply with these standards. In addition, each state
retains full discretion whether to ratify and, thereby, be legally bound by
the conventions and recommendations produced by the ILO.77 Further,
the ILO adheres to the general understanding that obligations arising from
ratified ILO conventions are confined to state borders: “In general the
obligations resulting from ratification of an international labour Conven-
tion, like all such obligations arising under general international Conven-
tions, are limited to matters arising within the jurisdiction of the party to
the Convention upon which the obligation rests.”78
The ILO norm-generation process is designed to allow considerable
participation of governments as well as employers’ and workers’ organiza-
tions, which results in large amounts of national information regarding the
conditions that would allow or hinder the ratification and application of
the proposed standards.79 Delegates from employers’ and workers’ groups
to-international-labour-standards/international-labour-standards-creation/lang—en/index
.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
77. See ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 19(5)(b). States are, however, bound to R
submit ILO conventions for the consideration of the national authorities and report to the
ILO as to the measures taken to submit conventions and recommendations to the competent
national authorities. ILO Constitution, Id. art. 19(5)(c). Only the most representative organi-
zations are entitled to receive copies of the information their governments communicated to
the Office concerning such measures. ILO, Memorandum Concerning the Obligation to Sub-
mit Conventions and Recommendations to the Competent Authorities, at arts. VIII(a),
VIII(b), GB292-10 (2005) available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/
@normes/documents/questionnaire/wcms_087324.pdf.
78. Comm’n Appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO to Examine
the Complaint Filed by the Government of Ghana Concerning the Observance by the Gov-
ernment of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Rep.,
para. 720, O.B. XLV(2), Supp. II (Apr. 1962) [hereinafter Portugal’s Report].
79. At both stages of the discussions at the Conference, employers’ and workers’
groups may propose texts, make amendments, and consider the ultimate form of the stan-
dard. See Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference arts. 39(1), 39(6) (adopted
on Nov. 21, 1919) [hereinafter Standing Orders of the ILC], available at http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc-so.htm. The Office sometimes seeks advice from the
United Nations and other specialized agencies as to proposed instruments, but the scope for
NGO participation remains limited. For the role of NGO’s in the ILO, see ILO Constitution,
supra note 48, art. 12(3), as well as Standing Orders of the ILC, supra art. 2(3)(j). For a R
general explanation on the relations of the ILO with NGOs, see Relations with NGOs, ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/pardev/civil-society/ngos/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). This partly
accounts for the relatively greater participation of human rights NGOs in UN activities
rather than in the ILO’s activities. NGOs may influence ILO work indirectly through the
international workers organizations, such as the International Trade Union Confederation
(ITUC), which have consultative status with the ILO, or by submitting information infor-
mally to the Office. They may further apply to the Director-General to be put on the list of
organizations whose objectives are in harmony with the objectives of the ILO. Such inclusion
on the list, if authorized, entitles them to be notified of meetings and to apply for special
permission to distribute documents in the ILO and to participate in meetings by making oral
presentations. Engaging Civil Society, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/pardev/civil-society/index.htm
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are intensely involved, almost on equal footing, at the different stages of
the discussions at the International Labour Conference and can propose
texts, make amendments, and deliberate on the ultimate form of the stan-
dard. Nevertheless, the statist model prevails in this context as well, as the
knowledge and information of the states and of the workers and employ-
ers are incorporated through national representatives. During the legisla-
tive stage of conventions and recommendations, the member states are
required to fill out questionnaires and provide information and comments
regarding national law and practice on the issue at hand.80 Only the most
representative organizations of each state are involved and consulted.81 A
similar state-centric approach prevails in the ILO’s supervisory system, as
will be demonstrated below.
C. The ILO’s Supervisory System: Sanctions and Incentives
Compliance with ILO standards is supervised through two separate,
yet complementary systems, both of which showcase the statist model of
responsibility: (1) a regular reporting system, based on the submission of
national reports in fixed intervals as to the member state’s compliance
with its legal obligations;82 and (2) a procedure for submitting complaints
regarding particular violations, open to a wide variety of players.83 These
two systems have diverging logics and features, and while both reflect the
statist conception of responsibility, the former follows it more closely. In
addition, a novel follow-up procedure supports the implementation of the
80. See Standing Orders of the ILC, supra note 79, art. 39(1). R
81. See Standing Orders of the ILC, supra note 79 arts. 39(1), 39(6); see also ILO R
Governing Body, The Functioning of Decision-Making Bodies, GB.289/3/2(Rev.), 289th Sess.
(Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb289/pdf/
gb-3-2.pdf.
In addition to the provisions of the Standing Orders referred to under paragraphs
3 and 4 above, Article 5(1)(a) of the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour
Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144) and Paragraph 5(a) of the Tripartite Con-
sultation (Activities of the International Labour Organisation) Recommendation,
1976 (No. 152), provide that consultations of employers’ and workers’ representa-
tives should be held on government replies to questionnaires concerning items on
the agenda of the Conference and government comments on proposed texts to be
discussed.
ILO, INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS DEP’T, HANDBOOK OF PROCEDURES RELATING TO INTER-
NATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2012), available at http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-normes/documents/publication/wcms_192621
.pdf [hereinafter ILO HANDBOOK OF PROCEDURES]. Note that the organizations that can
submit comments could include any industrial organization and are not limited to the repre-
sentative organizations. Workers’ and employers’ organizations may comment on their gov-
ernment’s response or send their comments directly to the Office.
82. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 19(5)(e) (obligation to report on ratified con- R
ventions), art. 19(6)(d) (obligation to report on unratified conventions), art. 22 (obligation to
report on recommendations), art. 23 (obligation of the Director-General to report this infor-
mation to the Conference).






      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 16 Side A      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL401.txt unknown Seq: 23  4-OCT-13 9:22
Summer 2013] Shared Responsibility 697
1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights at Work and was further modi-
fied and expanded in the 2008 Declaration.84
1. The Regular Reporting System
The ILO’s statist model is clearly evident in its reporting system in a
variety of ways. Only states are obligated to submit reports, and the state
is the only legal subject monitored under the procedure. Additionally, the
nature of the information that states are required to provide reflects stat-
ism. Member states are key players in the monitoring process and are obli-
gated to submit periodic reports on ratified conventions within differing
reporting cycles: every five years for “regular” conventions and a shorter
reporting cycle for fundamental and governance conventions (until re-
cently, every two years but now every three years).85 Workers’ and em-
ployers’ associations participate in the process via Article 23(2) of the ILO
Constitution, which mandates that all governmental reports be transmitted
to the workers’ and employers’ associations of their national state.86 These
associations, in turn, may submit comments to the state’s report, pointing,
for example, to discrepancies between law and practice or any other devia-
tion from the state’s labor standards obligations.87 Although allowing
these comments can be understood as a move toward shifting responsibil-
84. See ILO Declaration on Social Justice, supra note 30, art II. R
85. Many of the reporting obligations are anchored in Articles 22 and 35 of the ILO
Constitution, see ILO Constitution, supra note 48, arts. 22, 35. On the move to a three-year R
cycle, see ILO Comm. on Legal Issues and Int’l Labour Standards, Improvements in the Stan-
dards-Related Activities of the ILO, GB.306/LILS/4(Rev.), 306th Sess. (Nov. 2009). The na-
ture of these reports also varies. The most significant report is the first report, which serves as
a baseline for the particular country against which any progress is measured. Compare Report
Forms: First Report Forms, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/Re
portforms/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) with Report Forms: Country Base-
line Updates, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/Reportforms/
lang—en/index.htm. Reports on un-ratified conventions under Article 19 are discussed be-
low. See infra Part IV. On the significance of the four governance Conventions, relating to
tripartism, employment policy, and labour inspection, see ILO Declaration on Social Justice,
supra note 30, where they were designated as “most significant from the viewpoint of govern- R
ance covering tripartism, employment policy and labour inspection.” (the governance Con-
ventions). Id. at 14.
These are: the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81); the Employment Pol-
icy Convention, 1964 (No. 122); the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention,
1969 (No. 129); and the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)
Convention, 1976 (No. 144). During the 98th Session of the Conference (2009), the
governance Conventions, along with the fundamental Conventions, were acknowl-
edged as important elements in a strategy for recovering from the crisis, as indi-
cated in the Global Jobs Pact.
ILO Comm. on Legal Issues and Int’l Labour Standards, Ratification and Promotion of Fun-
damental and Governance ILO Conventions, para. 1, GB.306/LILS/6(& Corr.), 306th Sess.
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/docu
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_115984.pdf.
86. See ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 23(2). R
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ity from the state to its functional organizations, such comments are dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory. They are also submitted on a national
basis: each organization comments on its own government.88 NGOs may
not directly submit information to the Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR or Committee of
Experts), the body that is in charge of analyzing these reports. NGOs are,
therefore, obliged to cooperate with the employers’ and employees’ orga-
nizations, which can then channel the information gathered by the NGOs.
The statist model is similarly reflected in the nature of the CEACR’s
work, which can be characterized as semi-legal.89 This legal orientation
correlates with the CEACR’s composition: twenty prominent apolitical ju-
rists who are expected to act in an objective and neutral manner in their
evaluations, a departure from the tripartite structure common to most of
the ILO bodies.90 It should come as no surprise, then, that about two-
thirds of the staff involved in the Committee’s preparatory work are
lawyers.91
Further, the legal subject at the center of the Committee’s operations
is the individual state.92 Despite the fact that the CEACR does not have
the mandate of a judicial body, it nonetheless evaluates the periodical re-
ports and makes its own determination as to the extent to which each indi-
vidual state conforms to its legal obligations under the ILS.93 The
88. See infra notes 245–247 and accompanying text. R
89. The legal character of the CEACR is relevant here insofar as it indicates the use of
a statist model. Compare this model with legalism as an approach to compliance, which ad-
dresses three dimensions of legalism: (1) the degree of independence of the system; (2) the
degree to which the judgment affects the national arena; and (3) the degree to which actors
other than the state are able to operate the system. For our purposes here, we will only
address the third dimension. For an analysis of the CEACR in light of the full theory of
legalism as an approach to compliance, see THOMANN, supra note 4, at 104-17. R
90. The emphasis on law is almost inevitable as the department that is responsible for
preparing the draft CEACR report is almost exclusively staffed by lawyers. Id. at 114. This
legal focus is also evident in the legal materials the Committee utilizes in addition to the
national reports, such as collective agreements and court cases. See Miriam Hartlapp, Two
Variations on a Theme: Different Logics of Implementation Management in the EU and the
ILO, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 1, 10 (June 14, 2005), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/
texte/2005-007a.htm.
91. Hartlapp, supra note 90, at 10. R
92. The Committee of Experts’ mandate is to gather the periodical reports and evalu-
ate the extent to which each state conforms to its legal obligations. It consists of twenty
independent persons, from different countries, who qualify as experts in their legal or social
fields and purports to maintain independence, impartiality, and objectivity. See Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/
global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-of-ex-
perts-on-the-application-of-conventions-and-recommendations /index.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2013).
93. After a long-lasting debate as to the CEACR’s mandate and the legal nature of its
findings, the Committee adopted a pragmatic approach whereby it does not regard its finding
as binding judgments. However, such findings are binding unless the state in question re-
quests a different interpretation from the International Court of Justice or a tribunal estab-
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CEACR, in its assessment of state compliance, mostly engages in a legal
analysis of legal discrepancies, while neglecting violations in practice.94
This focus on law, rather than on the practical application of the norm,
necessarily directs attention to state authorities, as they are the generators
of law, rather than to the two partners in the labor relations, employees
and employers, who operate on the ground. Accordingly, the CEACR’s
key products are conclusions and comments, which are directed solely at
the individual state under review.95 There are two types of comments the
Committee can issue: observations and direct requests to governments.
Direct requests (to be distinguished from the “Direct Contact” procedure
described below) are unpublished appeals to the government under review
to provide more information or to initiate communication on technical
matters. When direct communication fails, or in severe cases of long-last-
ing noncompliance, the Committee of Experts publishes “Observations”
in its annual report.96 These refer explicitly to individual states, identifying
each of the “violating” states name by name. Notices of good practice of
states, indicating a sort of “best practices,” follow similar lines.97
The CEACR’s annual report on the application of labor standards and
recommendations is submitted for discussion to the Conference Commit-
tee, a standing committee that is a tripartite political body appointed by
the International Labour Conference.98 The Conference Committee
94. The questionnaires that are the basis of such information do include some ques-
tions on the actual application of labor laws. However, these questions constitute only a small
part of the questionnaire. See e.g., ILO Governing Body, Form for Reports on the Application
of Ratified Convention s (Article 22 of the Constitution): Domestic Workers Convention, 2011
(No. 189), GB.313/LILS/7/1, 313th Sess. (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/documents/metingdocument/wcms_175008.pdf.
95. The Committee of Experts’ report also includes a general survey, which will be
discussed infra Part IV. This is not an exhaustive description of the functions of the Commit-
tee. Over the years, the Committee has tried, mostly unsuccessfully, to expand its compe-
tence within the supervisory system. Such attempts include, for example, increasing its
competence as a judicial body by asserting that its interpretations are binding. See Alfred
Wisskirchen, The Standard-Setting and Monitoring Activity of the ILO: Legal Questions and
Practical Experience, 144 INT’L LAB. REV. 253, 273 (2005).
96. See Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommenda-
tions, supra note 92. Such Observations may be accompanied by a footnote requesting the R
government in question to submit full information regarding the case or a request to submit
to the Conference a detailed report on the subject at hand before the “regular” report is due.
ILO, The Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference:
A Dynamic and Impact Built on Decades of Dialogue and Persuasion, at 20 n.19 (2011) [here-
inafter Committee on the Application of ILS Standards], available at http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-normes/documents/publication/wcms_154192.pdf.
97. Cases of good practice acknowledge situations where a country has adopted a
unique and notable approach to the application of a convention. A case of good practice may
consist of a new approach to achieving or improving compliance with a convention and can
therefore be seen as a potential model for others. The Committee also mentions cases of
progress, whether “with satisfaction,” which indicates that the case is no longer a concern, or
“with interest,” indicating smaller steps and actions of progress. Committee on the Applica-
tion of ILS Standards, supra note 96, at 25. R
98. See ILO, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Casebook of Court Decisions 2
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selects several cases (about twenty-five in total) on which the CEACR has
issued observations for further examination.99 In each case, the Confer-
ence Committee requests that a governmental representative of the terri-
torial state where the alleged violation occurred appear before it. This
representative may provide further oral or written information and partici-
pate in the discussion of the case. The tripartite structure of the Confer-
ence Committee suggests that the discussions are of a political nature, in
contrast to the more objective, legal deliberations in the work of the
CEACR.100
The names of the states where particularly harsh violations have alleg-
edly occurred are mentioned in a special paragraph that appears in the
Conference Committee’s annual report, under the category of “continued
failure to implement.”101 The annual report may also add the Conference
Committee’s recommendations as to how to proceed, including recom-
mendations to redirect the handling of the case to the complaint proce-
dure. The Committee’s annual report is submitted to the Conference for
discussion and official adoption.102
Finally, at different stages of the monitoring process, the ILO supervi-
sory bodies may use the more informal “Direct Contact” procedure,103
ments/publication/wcms_106143.pdf. The Conference Committee’s characteristics and duties
are set mainly in Article 7 of the Standing Orders of the Conference. Standing Orders of the
ILC, supra note 79, art. 7. It is comprised of 200 or more members. See Int’l Labour Confer- R
ence, Committee on the Application of Standards, 99th. Sess., Information and Reports on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 3, 16 Part I (2010) [hereinafter ILC
Comm. App. Standards Report], available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-
ed_norm/-normes/documents/publication/wcms_145220.pdf.
99. See Wisskirchen, supra note 95, at 281—82. The cases are chosen in a way that R
represents a balanced selection of issues and geographical areas. The considerations for iden-
tifying appropriate cases include the cooperation of the particular state with previous re-
quests for information, the likelihood that a discussion would assist in producing change, the
severity of the situation, the occurrence of earlier discussions, and the scope and nature of
the violation. In practice, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU)
and World Confederation of Labour propose a list, with the agreement of the employers, and
this is presented for the Conference to agree upon. See id. As the Conference Committee is a
political body, political considerations may also play a part in the selection of the cases to be
discussed. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 93. R
100. See Committee on the Application of ILS Standards, supra note 96, at 11–12, 19. R
For a recent example of Conference Committee report see, Int’l Labour Conf., 101st. Sess.,
Committee on the Application of Standards, Information and Reports on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations, at 9-11 (2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/-ed_norm/-normes/documents/publication/wcms_190828.pdf.
101. See Committee on the Application of ILS Standards, supra note 96, at 83, 89. R
102. See Id. at 1–3, 105–10.
103. For an updated description of the informal Direct Contact procedure see, ILO
HANDBOOK OF PROCEDURES, supra note 81, at 54-55. R
This Handbook describes the procedures operating within the International La-
bour Organization in relation to the adoption and implementation of Conventions
and Recommendations. The present edition takes account of the adjustments to
the system for the supervision of international labour standards decided on by the
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which is also directed specifically at states and generally takes the form of
detailed verbal discussions between the ILO representative and relevant
government officials.104 This procedure enables a representative of the
ILO Director-General105 to personally conduct, often in a discreet man-
ner, such meetings and discussions as are necessary to resolve difficulties
with individual member states in the application of ILO standards. This is
usually done by visiting the member state concerned.106 Direct Contact
has no rigid rules and has been extensively used since the late 1970s.107
2. Supervision Procedures Based on Complaints
and Representations108
At first glance, the complaints procedures seem to be as reflective of
the statist model as the regular reporting system they supplement, for they
are similarly focused on the state as the sole actor responsible for uphold-
ing legal obligations under ratified conventions within its territory.109 The
Id. at 1. For further details as to the establishment of this procedure in 1968, see infra note
107. R
104. Direct Contact is mainly used in sufficiently important cases concerning the ratifi-
cation or the implementation of conventions and recommendations or cases before the CFA.
See LAMMY BETTEN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW: SELECTED ISSUES 405-05 (1993). When
Direct Contact is conducted, the supervisory bodies suspend the examination of the case.
Otherwise, the Conference Committee may select cases for further discussion.
105. This representative is usually an official of the Office, an independent person with
expertise on the subject, or a member of the Committee of Experts. See HÉCTOR
BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ, GERALDO VON POTOBSKY & LEE SWEPSTON, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS 86 (1996).
106. Even in the absence of a full Direct Contact procedure, the Committee of Experts
may support a request of the Director-General to send a representative to the country in
question in order to help fully understand and resolve a particular issue or problem. See,
BETTEN, supra note 104, at 404-05. R
107. The procedure originated in 1967 “with a view to developing dialogue with govern-
ments and employers’ and workers’ organizations in order to overcome difficulties encoun-
tered in the application of Conventions.” ERIC GRAVEL & CHLOÉ CHARBONNEAU-JOBIN,
THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS: ITS DYNAMIC AND IMPACT 16 (2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/-ed_norm/-normes/documents/publication/wcms_087808.pdf. In 1968, the Committee
of Experts set forth the principles of this procedure, and in June 1968, the Conference Com-
mittee announced itself in favor of the procedure. It began to function in 1979 on an experi-
mental basis, and in 1972, the Committee of Experts noted that it may be viewed as an
established procedure. See BETTEN, supra note 104, at 405-05. R
108. The complaint procedure is governed by the ILO Constitution, supra note 48, arts. R
26-34.
109. See Complaints, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-
international-labour-standards/complaints/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). The tripar-
tite Committee on Freedom of Association bases its jurisdiction on the constitutional guaran-
tee of freedom of association and therefore accepts complaints from trade unions and
employer organizations, regardless of whether the state in question has ratified the relevant
conventions (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention,
1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.
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complaints and representations system allows for several complaints pro-
cedures, including a separate procedure relating to freedom of association.
Industrial organizations, that is, employers’ and employees’ groups, can
allege that a member state violated a convention it previously ratified by
filing a representation. In addition, member states can charge another
member state with violating its obligations under a ratified convention by
filing a complaint. In severe and rare cases a full-scale investigation is
launched through the Commission of Inquiry or the Fact-Finding and Con-
ciliation Commission on Freedom of Association—the comparable body
in cases that involve freedom of association.110 Article 24 of the ILO Con-
stitution, which governs the representations procedure, one of the proce-
dures within the complaint system, explicitly refers to the failure of a
member state to comply with a ratified convention “within its
jurisdiction.”111
Once a representation—that is, a complaint alleging an ILS viola-
tion—has been submitted and deemed receivable,112 the ILO Governing
Body (GB) can establish a tripartite committee of the Governing Body,
composed of members of the Governing Body chosen in equal numbers
from the government, employers’ and workers’ groups, to investigate and
report on the case.113 The committee’s investigation is focused on re-
vealing any possible responsibility on the part of the territorial state for
the alleged wrong, once again underscoring the centrality of the statist
ing-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-on-freedom-of-association/in-
dex.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). Its jurisprudence, set forth in a digest published at regu-
lar intervals, is supplemented by the occasional decisions of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation
Commission on Freedom of Association and is closely related to that of the Committee of
Experts, which also provides a periodic General Survey on freedom of association. See ILO,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO 1—3 (5th rev. ed. 2006).
110. See DAVID TAJGMAN & KAREN CURTIS, ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A
USER’S GUIDE 57 (2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-
normes/documents/publication/wcms_087990.pdf (“[T]he FFCC [Fact-Finding and Concilia-
tion Commission] is rarely used.”); Labor Markets: Core Labor Standards Toolkit – Step 2,
THE WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOC
IALPROTECTION/EXTLM/0,,contentMDK:20224312~menuPK:390633~pagePK:148956~
piPK:216618~theSitePK:390615,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (“In rare cases, the Gov-
erning Body may appoint a Commission of Inquiry to conduct an independent
investigation.”).
111. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 24. R
112. Whether a representation is considered receivable depends on certain “procedu-
ral” factors, such as whether there is a specific reference to Article 24, whether the case
concerns the violation of an instrument that was ratified by the member state against which
the representation is made, whether the organization can be determined to be an industrial
organization in cases where the complaint originates from a functional organization, and sim-
ilar procedural requirements. See Standing Orders Concerning the Procedure for the Exami-
nation of Representations Under Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the International
Labour Organization, art 2. (adopted Apr. 8, 1932; modified Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter
Standing Orders of the Governing Body], available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/pub-
lic/-ed_norm/-normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcm_041899.pdf.
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model. Its report incorporates the response of the state’s government to
the accusations, including any recommendations the committee might
make to the state. Where the government’s response is not deemed satis-
factory, the GB is authorized to take various measures against the state.114
It can publish the original representation and the government’s re-
sponse115 in an attempt to embarrass and pressure the particular state as
the only responsible agent. It can also initiate the complaints procedure
under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution.116 Complaints regarding free-
dom of association violations are referred to the Committee on Freedom
of Association (CFA) and follow approximately the same procedures as
the representation procedure and, in appropriate cases, as the Commission
of Inquiry.117 The Committee of Experts is often put in charge of follow-
up on complaints submitted to the CFA.118
Yet despite this statist orientation, several features of the representa-
tion procedure somewhat diverge from strict statism. For example, the
representation procedure allows the involvement of employers’ organiza-
tions and, in even greater numbers, workers’ organizations.119 Unlike the
regular reporting system, where only Conference delegates of the national
most-representative workers’ and employers’ organizations are allowed to
comment on states’ convention compliance, the right to submit a represen-
tation against a state is granted to any “industrial organization of employ-
ers or workers.”120 This procedure, however, has been used only rarely, a
mere 107 times between 1924 and 2004.121 This can be explained as due to
either a lack of awareness of the procedure or the limited impact of its
outcome, which consists merely of a report published by an ad-hoc tripar-
tite committee, as opposed to the more severe results of the complaint
procedures set forth under Articles 26-34 of the ILO Constitution.122
114. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, arts. 25-26; see also Standing Orders of the Gov- R
erning Body, supra note 112, arts. 6-9. R
115. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 25. R
116. Id. art. 26.
117. Such referrals follow article 3, paragraph 2, of the standing orders. See Standing
Orders of the Governing Body, supra note 112, art. 3(2). The CFA is a fairly independent R
body as its chairperson is independent and the nine members, despite being chosen from the
three constituents, operate in their own personal capacity. While its investigative powers
somewhat resemble those of the Commission of Inquiry, its reports, or points of decision,
regularly accepted by the GB, have no legal effect in and of themselves. See Committee on
Freedom of Association, supra note 109. This is because neither the CFA nor the CCFF is R
mentioned in the ILO Constitution. However, they do have de facto influence on the legal
understanding of freedom of association, as their decisions are based on more than 2500
cases of legal and factual examinations. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 128. R
118. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 127. R
119. The representation procedure is anchored in the ILO Constitution, supra note 48, R
arts. 24-25.
120. For article 2(b) of the standing orders and the guidelines to implementing them,
see Standing Orders of the Governing Body, supra note 112, para. 9. R
121. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 119. R
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Indeed, under Article 26 of the Constitution, a state may file a com-
plaint alleging that a fellow member state has failed to comply with a con-
vention ratified by both states.123 The GB may also instigate this
procedure, either autonomously or in response to a complaint filed by any
ILO delegate.124 In the most severe and persistent cases, the GB can de-
cide to launch a full-scale investigation by constituting a Commission of
Inquiry, a quasi-judicial body125 that conducts thorough examinations of
the law and the practice at hand.126 The Fact-Finding and Conciliation
Commission on Freedom of Association (FFCC) is the comparable body
in cases that involve freedom of association and applies similar
procedures.127
The legal subject of the Commission of Inquiry’s investigation is al-
ways the individual state, again manifesting the statist model, which is ap-
parent in other features of the Commission’s procedure as well. The
Commission report is directed at ascertaining the responsibility of the indi-
vidual state for the matter at hand and gives detailed recommendations
that only the state is obligated to fulfill. The report is based on a substan-
tial investigation, which usually includes visits to the site and witness hear-
ings.128 The on-site visits, however, require the consent of the state in
123. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 26. R
124. Id. art. 26(4).
125. The Commission of Inquiry features several indicators of a quasi-judicial body: it is
composed of three legal experts acting in their personal capacities; its reports do not have to
be approved by the Conference and are directly submitted to the relevant state; and the
Director-General publishes automatically all of the Commission’s reports. See id. arts. 28-29;
ILO Governing Body, Improvements in the standards-related activities of the ILO – Articles
19, 24 and 26 of the Constitution, at para. 36, GB.288/LILS/1, 288th Sess. (Nov. 2003) GB.277/
6, 277th Sess. (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/
docs/gb288/pdf/lils-1.pdf (stating that in the absence of any formal rules, the recommendation
is to adopt the rules that were accepted by the Governing Body during the examination of
the first complaint that gave rise to the constitution of a Commission of Inquiry). The first
commission of inquiry had nominated three legal experts as members of the commission of
inquiry. Portugal’s Report, supra note 78, para. 11. R
126. The Commission of Inquiry is not bound by strict procedural regulations, and its
members are free to set new rules in accordance with the Constitution and the custom estab-
lished by previous Commissions. The first Commission of Inquiry in 1962 established this
practice, stating that:
As the Governing Body has not adopted any standing orders concerning the pro-
cedure to be followed for the consideration of complaints filed in accordance with
article 26 of the Constitution, the Officers of the Governing Body have considered
the procedure to be followed in the matter; their recommendations to the Gov-
erning Body, which are unanimous, are as follows . . . .
See Portugal’s Report, supra note 78, at 4. R
127. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 125. R
128. To give an example, the Commission of Inquiry that was established to investigate
Nicaragua perceived on-the-spot interviews as particularly important, conducting extensive,
on-the-spot interviews. See Comm’n of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitu-
tion to Examine the Observance by Nicaragua of the Freedom of Association and Protection
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which the investigation is being conducted.129 Within three months of the
report’s release, the state is expected to indicate whether it accepts the
recommendations therein; if so, it is left to the state to decide on the spe-
cific measures for implementing them.130 Alternatively, the state can sub-
mit a dispute to the International Court of Justice, for a final judgment on
the matter.131
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), and the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour
Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144), Rep., at paras. 33, 58, 59, O.B. LXXIV, Series B,
Supp. 2 (1991) [hereinafter Nicaragua’s Report]. The Commission of Inquiry in that case
conducted both on-the-spot interviews and interviews conducted in ILO headquarters. Id.
para. 57. The Myanmar case is another example where the Commission recognized and spe-
cifically noted the importance of visiting the country in order to form a direct impression of
the situation described in the complaint and acquire personal knowledge of the circum-
stances described in the mass of documents submitted to them. Comm’n of Inquiry Ap-
pointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to
Examine the Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),
Rep., at para78, O.B. LXXXI, Series B, Special Supp. (1996) [hereinafter Myanmar’s Re-
port]. Note, however, that all the procedures of the Commission are fluid, and their descrip-
tion is based on the procedures adopted so far in a typical case. See BARTOLOMEI DE LA
CRUZ, VON POTOBSKY & SWEPSTON, supra note 105, at 96. R
129. For the refusal of Mynamar to allow such visits, see Myanmar’s Report, supra note
128, para. 78. R
Following its Second Session, the Commission considered that it would be desira-
ble to visit Myanmar in order to supplement the information in its possession. The
Commission therefore requested the Government, in a letter dated 28 November
1997, to consent to a visit to Myanmar for a period of seven to ten days; it ex-
pressed the hope that the Government would offer its cooperation and assistance
in this respect.
Id. para. 69. With respect to procedures that involve investigations of violations of freedom of
association, see ILO, Special Procedures for the Examination in the International Labour Or-
ganization of Complaints Alleging Violations of Freedom of Association—Annex 1, at para.
67 [hereinafter Freedom of Association Complaint Procedures], available at http://www.ilo
.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2565060:NO (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013), which outlines:
the current procedure for the examination of complaints alleging infringements of
trade union rights, based on the provisions adopted by common consent by the
Governing Body of the International Labour Office and the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations in January and February 1950, and also on the deci-
sions taken by the Governing Body at its 117th Session (November 1951), 123rd
Session (November 1953), 132nd Session (June 1956), 140th Session (November
1958), 144th Session (March 1960), 175th Session (May 1969), 184th Session (No-
vember 1971), 202nd Session (March 1977), 209th Session (May-June 1979) and
283rd Session (March 2002) with respect to the internal procedure for the prelimi-
nary examination of complaints, and lastly on certain decisions adopted by the
Committee on Freedom of Association itself.
Id. pmbl.
130. See ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 29(2). Even when states accept the rec- R
ommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, in most cases these recommendations are not
implemented fully or in a timely manner. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 124. R
131. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 34(1). There is a debate as to the legal status R
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Under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, when a member state con-
tinuously refuses to implement the recommendations in a Commission of
Inquiry report or ICJ decision, the GB can take action to secure compli-
ance.132 This authority was invoked for the first (and, thus far, only) time
in ILO history in 2000, when the GB initiated measures against Myanmar
in order to end forced labor in the state.133 In this context, too, the state
was the primary entity assigned responsibility for workers’ rights, while
the multinational corporations that were involved and could have been
considered culprits (notably TOTAL)134 were never officially deemed a
party to be investigated. In the face of contradictory evidence as to the
corporations’ involvement in profiting from the forced labor, the Commis-
sion of Inquiry concluded that it could come to no finding on the matter
due to its inability to visit Myanmar.135 It can be assumed that had key
private companies been officially considered potential culprits along with
the state, more rigorous efforts could have been made to verify the facts.
3. Additional Tools: Technical Assistance and Declaration Follow-Up
As a supplement to its primarily legal activities, since the 1950s the
ILO has been developing a promotional approach to the implementation
the ICJ. See THOMANN, supra note 4, at 122-23. For our purposes, it suffices to point out the R
legal power the state has over the legal status of the report.
132. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 33. Article 33 of the ILO Constitution could R
be invoked: “In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the
recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, or in the
decision of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be.” Id.
133. ILO Governing Body, Measures, Including Action Under Article 33 of the Constitu-
tion of the International Labour Organization, to Secure Compliance by the Government of
Myanmar with the Recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry Established to Examine
the Observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), GB.277/6, 277th Sess. (Mar.
2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb277/pdf/gb-6
.pdf.
134. For a description of TOTAL’s involvement in Myanmar, see, for example, Ryan
Tiz, Searching for a Corporate Liability Standard Under the Alien Tort Claims Act in Doe v.
Unocal, 82 OR. L. REV. 559, 562-63 (2003).
135. Myanmar’s Report, supra note 128, para. 452. R
There was evidence before the Commission in the form of secondary statements
that forced labor had been used until May 1995 for ground clearance work to pro-
vide access to survey teams for the Yadana gas pipeline project in Yebyu township,
Tanintharyi Division. In a communication addressed to the Commission, TOTAL
stated that it was wrong to claim that the preparatory clearing work could have
been undertaken by forced laborers for the purpose of facilitating the access of the
project teams. During the years of 1993 and 1994, clearing work had been carried
out under the supervision of TOTAL by the Compagnie générale de géophysique
(CGG). In view of the contradiction between the facts presented, and since the
Commission was denied access to Myanmar to supplement its evidence, no finding
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of its standards through technical assistance activities.136 In accordance
with its emphasis on development, this technical assistance is provided
mainly to raise labor standards in developing countries. During the 1970s,
similar goals guided comprehensive missions working to eradicate unem-
ployment in developing countries, alongside scaled-down missions staffed
by regional employment teams. There are many who claim that these ac-
tivities should be expanded, as they reflect the optimal use of the ILO’s
resources and should, therefore, take priority over its legal activities.137
The technical assistance programs are strongly grounded on the statist
conception in that they center mostly on national economic development
and progress. In addition, many technical assistance missions focus on the
legal aspects of the ILO’s goals, providing, for example, assistance with
drafting national legislation that complies with ILS and the ratification of
ILS.138 Technical assistance might also take the form of seminars and advi-
sory and direct contact missions.139
In addition to the technical assistance initiative, the follow-up proce-
dure supports the implementation of the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental
Rights at Work. It has been applied in a manner that emphasizes the goals
of ratification of the fundamental conventions through dialogue and tech-
nical assistance and of uniting all member states under the regular ILO
supervisory system with respect to these instruments. This inclination is
mostly evident in the ILO annual reports, the first component of three
mechanisms comprising the follow-up system140 Member-state govern-
ments are obligated to submit annual reports detailing steps they have
taken to implement any of the eight fundamental conventions, despite
having yet to ratify them.141 Mirroring the regular reporting system, each
136. These activities were undertaken in the framework of the United Nations Pro-
gramme of Technical Assistance. Under this programme, the ILO has helped to develop
vocational training in developing countries. For a recent historic overview of technical assis-
tance, see RODGERS ET AL., supra note 49, at 182-83. R
137. Brian Langille, Imagining Post “Geneva Consensus” Labour Law for Post “Wash-
ington Consensus” Development, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 523, 538-39 (2010); see also,
Langille, supra note 2, at 420-42. But see Alston, supra note 2. R
138. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 135-136. R
139. Seminars are often provided by the International Training Center in Turin, Italy.
See About Us, INT’L TRAINING CENTER OF THE ILO, http://www.itcilo.it/en/the-centre/about-
us (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
140. See About the Declaration, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/
lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). The two remaining interlinked components of
the follow-up mechanisms are the global report and the setting of priorities for technical
assistance. The Director-General prepares a report each year on the global situation of one
of the four sets of principles and rights during the preceding four-year period. The report
analyzes the situation of that principle or right in both ratifying and nonratifying countries,
and each of the four core rights at work is covered every four years. The global reports are
submitted to the ILO Conference. The Global Report are available on the ILO website at
Global Reports, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/globalreports/lang—en/in-
dex.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
141. See About the Declaration, supra note 140. “Concerning ratification of Conven- R
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state submits its report to the national workers’ and employees’ organiza-
tions for comments and observations.142 Additional comments can be sub-
mitted by international organizations such as the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions or the International Organisation of
Employers (IOE).143 An independent panel of experts (the ILO Declara-
tion Experts Advisors) evaluates these reports, and the GB discusses them
and provides a summary of the reports and their comments in the Intro-
duction to the Review of Annual Reports.144 This Review is directed at
evaluating the individual performance of each state in furthering conven-
tions they have yet to ratify. The states’ respective progress is evaluated
against a baseline set individually for each member state.145 A significant
portion of the state’s annual report is devoted to information for evaluat-
ing the prospects for the ratification of the fundamental conventions and
legal instruments to promote the rights afforded therein,146 despite the
ILO’s explicit statement that the “the annual review should be the occa-
sion to go beyond descriptions of legislation in order to assess
progress.”147
To sum up, this Part has demonstrated how and in what form the stat-
ist model dominates the supervisory system and other key operational
functions of the ILO. However, recent global economic, political, and legal
it does promote ratification by requiring member States to respect, promote and realize the
principles and rights contained in the fundamental Conventions.” ILO Governing Body, Re-
view of Annual Reports Under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work, para. 16, GB.307/3(&Corr.), 307th Sess. (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/documents/meetingdocument/
wcms_123833.pdf.
142. See ILO Declaration, supra note 1, pt. II(B) para. 1 (referencing Article 23 of the R
ILO Constitution, which obligates the member states to consult with their employers’ and
employees’ organizations).
143. For an example of a recent observation, see, Int’l Org. of Emp’rs, General Obser-
vation by The International Organisation Of Employers (IOE) Under the 2012 Annual Re-
view, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-declaration/documents/
publication/wcms_098135.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
144. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 78. R
145. “Annual reports are in the form of country baselines. They continue to be in the
form of annual reports only in the case of new member states.” Current Compilation of
Country Baselines, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybase-
lines/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). For the compilation of county baselines,
see id.
146. The Annex to the ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
AT WORK AND ITS FOLLOW-UP, states: “The aim of the follow-up described below is to en-
courage the efforts made by the Members of the Organization to promote the fundamental
principles and rights enshrined in the Constitution of the ILO and the Declaration of Phila-
delphia and reaffirmed in this Declaration.” ILO Declaration, supra note 1, annex, pt. I, para. R
1.
147. ILO Governing Body, Review of Annual Reports under the Follow-Up to the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: Introduction by the ILO Declara-
tion Expert-Advisers to the Compilation of Annual Reports, para. 6, GB.289/4(&Corr. 1 & 2),
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developments mandate a new conception of responsibility. By contrast to
the state-centered conception of responsibility that, by and large, currently
governs international labor law, we argue that a conception of shared
responsibly is better suited to contend with the contemporary challenges
faced by ILO. In the next Part, we present such an alternative conception
of responsibility.
III. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOR
When we use the term “shared responsibility,” we mean that the re-
sponsibility to remedy the unjust conditions suffered by workers anywhere
in the world does not necessarily rest with only one particular state or one
particular actor, but rather, could be shared by various actors and
institutions.
Our conception of responsibility corresponds to what David Miller has
termed remedial responsibility. Miller distinguishes between remedial and
outcome responsibility. The latter determines whether an agent produced
an outcome and thus is required to compensate for the damage it caused,
whereas the former determines whether an agent bears an obligation to
remedy harm not necessarily caused by the agent itself.148 The two types
of responsibility are not completely detached. One of the factors taken
into account in allocating remedial responsibility is who bears outcome
responsibility.149 In discussing global justice and labor, remedial responsi-
bility is our main concern, since, as Miller explains, “the idea of remedial
responsibility potentially applies whenever we encounter a situation in
need of remedy.”150 The starting point of any consideration of remedial
responsibility, then, is an unjust state of affairs requiring some kind of
correction, which raises the question of whose responsibility it is to make
this correction.151 In the context of labor, when the goal is defined in
terms of ensuring a minimum of basic rights and standards, considerations
of remedial responsibility focus on the question of who bears the responsi-
bility to ensure workers these basic rights and standards.152 As described
148. MILLER, supra note 3, ch. 4; see also Toni Erskine, Assigning Responsibility to Insti- R
tutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and Quasi-States, in CAN INSTITUTIONS HAVE RE-
SPONSIBILITIES?: COLLECTIVE MORAL AGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1, 85 (Toni
Erskine ed., 2003) (making a similar distinction between prospective and retrospective respon-
sibility). For a different classification of types of responsibility, see DARREL MOELLENDORF,
GLOBAL INEQUALITY MATTERS 143 (2009).
149. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 84-85. R
150. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 98 (2007).
151. Our understanding of remedial responsibility is broader than Miller’s. We accept
Moellendorf’s criticism of Miller, asserting, “Miller focuses on simple interactional problems
in which the assignment of costs for remediating an event should be guided by the assump-
tion that before the tort-like events holdings were just. That assumption cannot guide us
when the background institutions, which establish holdings, are in question.” MOELLENDORF,
supra note 148, at 146. Thus, for example, the current legal distribution of benefits and bur- R
dens between employers and workers should not necessarily be considered a just distribution.
152. Remedial responsibility may be allocated to individuals or to collectives. What
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above, many workers in the world today are in desperate need of such a
remedy. Their hardship demands a reassessment of who is responsible for
this remedy. Our conception of shared responsibility rests on the assump-
tion that in the contemporary global economy this remedial responsibility
could be shared by more than one particular actor.
The idea of shared responsibility is increasingly arising in both legal
and philosophical contexts. From a legal perspective, the need to address
the new complex economic and social realities by extending the scope of
responsibility has been recognized recently in several court decisions at
both national and transnational levels of litigation. These decisions have
introduced innovative doctrines that rest on a legal understanding of
shared responsibility in the areas of tort law, environmental law, and
human rights.153 A growing number of political philosophers and legal
scholars are attempting to develop new conceptions of shared responsibil-
ity to address problems of background injustice stemming from economic,
political, and legal global changes. In what follows, we discuss two such
conceptions of shared responsibility, one proposed by Margot Salomon
and the other by Iris Young, and analyze their limitations in terms of ap-
plicability to the current challenges faced by the ILO. We then propose a
new model of shared responsibility that elaborates on the “labor connec-
tion model” we developed in a previous article.154 This conception of
shared responsibility offers, in our view, not only a theoretical basis, but
also the practical foundation for implementing the idea in the ILO.
A. Shared Responsibility: An International Approach
 and a Global Civil Society Approach
In her book Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty
and the Development of International Law, Margot Salomon develops a
novel conception of shared responsibility among states toward the world’s
poor in developing countries. Analyzing existing international conven-
tions, particularly the Declaration on the Right to Development, Salomon
argues that sustainable progress toward implementing the right to devel-
opment requires not only that states adopt effective policies, but also ele-
vated levels of international cooperation and shared responsibility among
states.155 In contrast to the existing outdated conceptions of international
philosophical literature. For the purpose of this discussion, we consider entities that may bear
collective responsibility those that have the capacity to deliberate morally and to decide col-
lectively on a purposive action. See Erskine, supra note 148, at 69-74. Such entities may in- R
clude identity groups such as nations or organized religious groups, as well as institutions
such as corporations, political parties, and international institutions.
153. See OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM, ch.
6 (2004) (regarding the doctrine of “direct liability” introduced by the UK Supreme Court);
see also SALOMON, supra note 9, at 64; Ariel Porat, Collective Responsibility in Tort Law, 23 R
MISHPATIM [LAWS] 311, 322-25 (2004) (regarding the doctrines of “market share liability”
and “enterprise liability” in US tort litigation) (Isr.).
154. Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner & Faina Milman-Sivan, Global Justice, Labor Stan-
dards, and Responsibility, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 117 (2011).
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human rights law, which rest on the assumption that territorial states bear
principal responsibility for human rights, Salomon claims that the effective
realization of economic and social rights imposes certain responsibilities
on states other than the victims’ own state and entails that states act col-
lectively and take proactive steps to discharge their shared responsibilities
in the global economy.156 While Salomon recognizes the primary responsi-
bility of developing states for promoting human and social rights within
their own territories and remedying the deteriorated social, health, and
economic conditions, she argues that this “does not weaken what is essen-
tially a complementary duty of the international community to remedy the
violation of minimum essential levels of economic, social and cultural
rights.”157 This suggests a need for a reform of the global economic system
as a whole. She calls for the implementation of the due diligence standard,
where the existence of negative effects proves fault on the part of the
states and demonstrates that states should have acted differently or fore-
seen the outcome of their activities.158 Moreover, in circumstances where
basic human rights have been violated in the global context, states that are
the beneficiaries of the global order especially have a shared responsibil-
ity, namely, a positive duty, to take action to remedy the violation and
prevent its continuation.159 One of the main justifications for such a duty
is that states that benefit from the existing global order have greater ca-
pacity to rectify the wrongful state of affairs.160
While Salomon has taken an important step forward in demonstrating
the need to enhance global cooperation among states to achieve develop-
ment goals, her analysis centers on the legalities of international relations
among states and neglects to take into account actual global economic and
social processes that affect the global labor market. These would include
the increasing role played by transnational production chains and that of
private actors wielding enormous economic power, often greater than that
of many countries. By focusing on responsibility shared by states alone,
Salomon’s conception does not address the particular problem of worker
exploitation on the interactional level and thereby fails to assign responsi-
bility to many effective actors with a profound capacity to remedy unjust
working conditions—for example, employers and other private actors who
are participants in the transnational production chains.
By contrast to Salomon and her legal theory of shared responsibility
that addresses interstate relations, Iris Young has proposed a political
model of shared responsibility that contends with injustice on the interac-
156. Id. at 98-101.
157. Id. at 184.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 192.
160. Id. Salomon writes: “However, if basic rights have already been violated in a global
context, and, for example, people are starving, then the obligation imposed is also positive—
that is, every state, to a greater or lesser degree, is under obligation to take action to remedy
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tional level and includes private actors and civil society.161 She explicitly
formulated her model to address existing exploitative working conditions
in the global labor market, particularly in sweatshops in the apparel indus-
try. Young’s model, termed “the social connection model of responsibil-
ity,” is based on the presupposition that all those who take part in what
she calls “the social structure” share a moral responsibility to remedy
workers’ unjust conditions.162 “Our responsibility derives from belonging
together with others in a system of interdependent processes of coopera-
tion and competition through which we seek benefits in the aim to realize
projects.”163
Young’s model of shared responsibility is political, rather than legal. It
does not seek to identify the particular agents that violated workers’ labor
rights in a specific case. Instead, it rests on the understanding that harm
resulting from structural injustice is a consequence of the actions of mil-
lions of agents who contribute, through their participation, to the process
that produces unjust outcomes in the apparel industry. These agents in-
clude, according to Young, unskilled, immigrant, and potential workers, as
well as entrepreneurs, investors in large exporting firms, executives in mul-
tinational corporations, factory owners, city governments, consumers, uni-
versities, and members of the fashion industry such as designers and
fashion journal editors.164 The responsibility to remedy the structurally
unjust working conditions in sweatshops is shared by all these agents. This
responsibility can be discharged only through collective action, defined in
political terms.165 In Young’s words, “the point is not to blame, punish, or
seek redress from those who did [wrong], but rather to enjoin those who
participate by their actions in the process of collective action to change”
the injustice produced through structures.166
According to Young, this responsibility is not shared equally. She sug-
gests four parameters for allocating responsibility based on the actor’s po-
sition in the social structure:167 (1) power, actual or potential, to influence
161. See YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 123-51. R
162. Id.; Young, Responsibility and Global Justice, supra note 3, at 112. R
163. Young, Responsibility and Global Justice, supra note 3, at 119. Social connections R
are viewed by Young as prior to political institutions both ontologically and morally. Simi-
larly to Locke and other social contract philosophers, as well as more modern theorists like
Charles Beitz, see CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
78-79 (1979), and Onora O’Neill, see ONORA O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A
CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL REASONING ch. 4 (1996), Young argues that politi-
cal institutions arise because people need them to regulate their social connections. Accord-
ing to Young, “the moral status of political institutions arises from the obligations of justice
generated by social connection: such institutions are instruments through which these obliga-
tions can be discharged.” Young, Responsibility and Global Justice, supra note 3, at 105. In R
this sense, the nationalist global position “makes prior what is posterior from a moral point
of view.” Id. at 105.
164. See Young, Responsibility and Global Justice, supra note 3, at 112, 113, 116. R
165. Id. at 123-25.
166. Id. at 122.
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the unjust process at hand; (2) privilege, that is, the level of benefit from
the structural injustice; (3) interest in the transformation of the structural
injustice, which, as she notes, unfortunately tends to coincide with minimal
power to effect such a transformation; and (4) collective ability, that is, the
relative ability to remedy the situation by joining others in taking collec-
tive action to change unjust structures.168 Political collective action can be
achieved by pressuring state institutions to change this reality, but the goal
can also be attained through global interaction like in the case of the antis-
weatshop movement.169
Young’s political conception of shared moral responsibility toward
sweatshop workers could justify some practical solutions to the problem of
compliance with international labor standards, particularly in the realm of
civil society. Moreover, her social connection model is broad enough to
encompass additional spheres that are characterized by unjust background
conditions in the current global economy, such as the environment, for
example. However, the political nature of Young’s theory is not compati-
ble with our present goal, namely, to develop a theory of shared responsi-
bility that can guide the practices and procedures of the ILO. Young’s
model calls for collective political action by millions of agents around the
world170 whereas the conception of shared responsibility required for the
ILO should be more legalistically conceived, striving to expand the scope
of actors that bear responsibility for a specific violation of labor standards
as they are defined under ILO conventions.
Moreover, according to Young, all actors that partake in the social
connection bear some responsibility for workers’ rights. These include ac-
tors, whether agents or institutions, that do not play a role in the chain of
production (for example, consumers, municipalities, and fashion design-
ers).171 However, we argue that greater responsibility to remedy the un-
just conditions of workers is borne by actors who partake in the labor
connection, which is defined either in legal terms of employer-employee
relations or in substantial terms, that is, actors who contribute to the pro-
duction chain and participate in bringing a product to the marketplace (in-
cluding manufacturers and distributors).172
In the next Section, we lay out our conception of shared responsibility,
which better fits the realities of international labor and could apply to ex-
isting international labor institutions such as the ILO. This conception
draws from our model of shared responsibility for international labor,
which we have termed the “labor connection model.”173
168. Id.
169. For a more detailed and thorough criticism of Iris Young’s approach, see Dahan,
Lerner & Milman-Sivan, supra note 154, at 449-51. R
170. See Young, Responsibility and Global Justice, supra note 3, at 123. R
171. Id. at 107-11.
172. This is especially true in the case of what has recently been termed “super employ-
ers,” such as Wal-Mart, which is a prominent example. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERN-
ING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 97-103 (2010).
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B. The Labor Connection Model and Principles
of Shared Responsibility
Under the proposed labor connection model, responsibility for reme-
dying the unjust conditions of workers in the global era does not rest with
one agent or institution, but, rather, is shared, albeit unequally, amongst
the various actors in the global labor market. These include actors on the
interactional level (for example, employers, private companies, and con-
sumers) and on the institutional level (for example, states and interna-
tional institutions).174 On both levels, assigning responsibility for workers’
welfare is an intricate and complex task. The responsibility for working
conditions is not contingent on conventional legal definitions of employee-
employer relations but instead on a set of principles that guide the alloca-
tion of responsibility among all the participants in the production chain as
well as political institutions that impact the global labor market. In this
Section, we outline four such principles drawn heavily from the work of
Christian Barry.175
1. The Connectedness Principle
The principle of connectedness has special significance in the sphere
of labor. Connectedness—that is, the existence of a special relationship
between people—creates unique moral obligations. In contrast to obliga-
tions toward anonymous others, the obligations that arise from connected-
ness, also termed “associative duties,” carry extra moral weight.176 Under
Christian Barry’s definition, the principle of connectedness can be con-
strued in two different ways: first, in terms of shared identity, for example,
membership in a community, nation, or tribe; and second, in terms of par-
ticipating in a joint activity, for example, working in a factory. When this
principle is applied in the labor context, the joint activity meaning be-
comes a key factor in determining how responsibility toward workers is
distributed. Labor relations are characterized by an intricate web of mu-
tual responsibilities and rights, in which workers enjoy special protection
and status. This unique character is expressed in the legal sphere by treat-
ing labor contracts as relational contracts, as distinguished from transac-
tional contracts. A transactional contract is of short duration, describes a
precise transaction of money and goods, usually a onetime-only exchange
of an easily commoditized good for cash, and includes no element of altru-
ism and little or no future cooperation. Parties to relational contracts, in
contrast, develop long-term relationships that are based on trust and soli-
darity and far exceed the terms of the original document.177
174. MILLER, supra note 3, at 62. R
175. Global Justice: Aims, Arrangements, and Responsibilities, in CAN INSTITUTIONS
HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES?, supra note 148, at 218, 227-31. R
176. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 48-65 (2001).
177. Robert. C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
149, 151 (2005); Ian R. Macneil, Contracting Worlds and Essential Contract Theory, 9 SOC. &
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The expansion of the chain of production beyond state borders and
the emergence of new modes of production have led to a new reality,
where the traditional legal definition of employer-employee relations can
no longer serve as the sole criterion for determining the degree of connect-
edness between parties. The question of which actors should be regarded
as partaking in the joint activity that we have termed “the labor connec-
tion” is one of the central dilemmas of global labor today. For example,
one may argue that manufacturers, subcontractors, and investors could be
considered actors in the labor connection. Some, such as Young, argue
that participants in the “joint activity” of sweatshops should include such
additional actors as consumers, fashion designers, and local municipali-
ties.178 While we agree with Young that such actors should bear some de-
gree of responsibility for remedying the unjust labor conditions, their
responsibility is of a lesser degree relative to actors that we define as tak-
ing part in the labor connection. In the labor connection, the actors that we
define as part of the ‘labor connection’ have greater responsibility because
of the greater connectedness among them.179
Under the principle of connectedness, within the production chain di-
rect employers bear greater responsibility toward workers than the brands.
Similarly, in the ILO context, the government in whose jurisdiction the
violation occurred bears greater responsibility under the principle of con-
nectedness than the government in whose jurisdiction the brand resides.
The principle of connectedness is also expressed in the Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights,180 on which we will elaborate below.
According to the Guiding Principles and Ruggie’s commentary to the
Principles, “States should set out clearly the expectation that all business
enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human
rights throughout their operations.”181 Thus, a home country where the
headquarters of the involved company resides has the responsibility to ad-
dress the company’s international activities in terms of treatment of
human rights. Regarding corporate responsibility to respect human rights,
Ruggie’s commentary refers to “adverse human rights impacts [of corpo-
ration] . . . either through their own activities or as a result of their busi-
ness relationships with other parties.”182 According to Ruggie, the core
companies are expected not only to refrain from “causing or contributing
178. See Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, supra note 8, at 374–83 (dis- R
cussing political responsibility as opposed to liability); Young, Responsibility and Global Jus-
tice, supra note 3, at 107, 127. R
179. Determining the level of connectedness requires an elaborated theory, which will
include criteria for measuring proximities and interconnections between actors both inside
and outside the labor chain.
180. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
Guiding Principles].
181. Id. para. 2.
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to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and [to] ad-
dress such impacts when they occur,” but also to “[s]eek to prevent or
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their op-
erations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they
have not contributed to those impacts.”183 Thus, core companies are re-
sponsible for what happens in their affiliate operations, not only when
their decisions contributed to the harm suffered by third parties, but also
when the companies did not make any such decision and were merely as-
sociated with the affiliate companies or contractors that violated human
rights.184
2. The Capacity Principle
There are various factors that determine the capacity of agents to rec-
tify the unjust conditions of workers. One factor is scope of influence, that
is, the number of workers whose labor conditions could be improved by
the actions of the given agent or institution.185 Actors on the interactional
level could generally have a lesser scope of influence than powerful actors
on the institutional level. A local factory owner who has the capacity to
remedy the unjust working conditions of several workers at one textile
factory in Indonesia has a smaller scope of influence than an international
entity such as the WTO, which could link trade benefits to working condi-
tions in the particular industry and thus has the capacity to ameliorate the
conditions of many workers in that industry. Accordingly, as discussed in
Part II, the ILO regards its member states to be the primary agents bear-
ing remedial responsibility for the work conditions of each of their
citizens.
Capacity can also be measured by the extent of political and economic
power an actor wields to operate on both the institutional and interac-
tional levels. Actors may be able to influence the rules of global trade or
impact the structure of global institutions so as to remedy unjust working
conditions around the world. Exemplifying this are the power each of the
G8 (now G20) states has to determine the structure and rules of the global
economy and the ability of certain select states to determine the rules and
policies by which the International Monetary Fund, WTO, or World Bank
operate. Strong economies could also impose unilateral sanctions linked to
183. Id. para. 13(a)-(b).
184. For a detailed and illuminating analysis of the Guiding Principles approach to this
issue, see Radu Mares, Responsibility to Respect: Why the Core Company Should Act When
Affiliates Infringe Rights, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 169, 178 (Radu Mares ed., 2012).
185. This use of the term “influence” is different from John Ruggie’s use. Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corpo-
rations and Other Business Enterprises, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development:
Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”, paras. 7-8, 14-15, U.N.
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labor standards.186 In this context, it could be concluded that under the
principle of capacity, the world’s powerful states bear greater responsibil-
ity than the weaker states to remedy unjust work conditions. TNCs should
be similarly examined in terms of the leverage they can bring to bear in
these forums.
Further, the capacity of agents or institutions depends on the defini-
tion of the desired standards and norms to be implemented. And, moreo-
ver, the capacity to implement a standard varies according to the nature of
the agent that is responsible for remedying the unjust labor conditions.
Compare, for example, the capacity of TNCs and states to eliminate child
labor. TNCs could have the ability to enforce health and safety regulations
throughout their global production chains; and with regard to child labor
standards, their primary and most salient ability is to refrain from employ-
ing children in their factories.187 Yet in certain circumstances, the nonem-
ployment of children in factories might worsen their situation, such as
where their only alternative is to work in the informal sector, where condi-
tions might be substantially worse.188 States, as opposed to TNCs, are gen-
erally considered the main agents able to undertake the responsibility of
rectifying conditions in these contexts. Under certain conditions, states
may have the capacity to adopt comprehensive social and economic poli-
cies, such as establishing a comprehensive schooling system and other so-
cial services (child allowances, pensions, access to credit, etc.), which
would give children access to education and thereby free them from the
need to work for subsistence.189
Lastly, the relative degree of capacity would be taken into account in
determining each actor’s responsibility, and in some cases, one actor’s ca-
pacity will be determined by the capacity of other actors. In certain in-
stances, however, the capacity principle should not be applied in the sense
of a measure of the capacity of each individual actor, but, rather, to take
into account the joint capacities of more than one actor. Indeed, there
could be cases in which assigning responsibility based on the combined
action of two actors, each of whom has less capacity than an individual
third actor, could be more effective than assigning responsibility to the
actor with the highest level of individual capacity.
186. For an overview, see HEPPLE, supra note 5, at 89-105. R
187. Another option is part-time employment of children, which affords them some
income but also frees them to attend school part-time. Debra Satz, Child Labor: A Normative
Perspective, 17 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 297, 303-06 (2003).
188. See id. at 303.
189. The question of which policies are effective for combating child labor is hotly de-
bated. See, e.g., Drusilla K. Brown, Allan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, Child Labor:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 195, 218, 225-37
(Kaushik Basu et al. eds., 2003)(discussing limits on child labor, improvements in educational
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3. The Beneficiary Principle
In the context of global labor, benefit primarily refers to economic
gain. For example, in the international chain of production, TNCs, more so
than subcontractors or managers of local factories in developing states,
benefit from production that is carried out under unjust conditions.
Prakash Sethi has gathered illuminating data on the earnings of different
corporations as compared to workers’ pay in developing countries.190 Cor-
porations such as Nike and Reebok earn a gross profit margin of nearly
forty percent. The cost of making a pair of Reebok shoes is thirteen U.S.
dollars, with only one dollar paid for labor, while the shoes typically sell
for sixty to seventy dollars a pair.191 In this sense, if responsibility is dis-
tributed solely according to the principle of benefit, the TNC has a greater
responsibility to remedy the unjust labor conditions than to the subcon-
tractors. Yet economic benefit can be direct and indirect. Whereas TNCs
benefit directly from cheap labor under unjust conditions, the govern-
ments of developed states, as recipients of taxes paid by the TNCs whose
management is located in their territories, can be considered indirect
beneficiaries.
Benefit can be understood not only in economic terms but also in po-
litical terms. Taking the right of freedom of association as an example,
nondemocratic regimes stand to benefit from an un-unionized labor mar-
ket, since unions may present a threat to their political dominance and
authority. Similarly, neoliberal governments treat unions as obstacles to
the economic efficiency of the laissez-fair market and regard their actions
as interfering with property rights and contractual freedoms. In the con-
text of the ILO, pragmatic considerations would suggest focusing on eco-
nomic gain, however, and identifying those actors who benefit
economically from production under unjust conditions. Economic benefit
can serve as a relatively exact measurement of the benefit extracted by
each actor. In other words, the more a particular private or public actor
benefits from the violation, the greater its responsibility toward the
workers.
4. The Contribution Principle
Christian Barry provides a possible application of the principle of con-
tribution. This principle, under his definition, mandates that “agents [be]
responsible for addressing acute deprivations when they have contributed,
or are contributing, to bringing [those situations] about.”192 In the labor
context, this translates into agents’ responsibility for remedying unjust la-
bor conditions that they are contributing, or have contributed, to bringing
about. Barry proposes a detailed and complex methodology for measuring
the degree of the contribution of agents or institutions to unjust situations.
190. S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS 58-59 (2003).
191. Id.
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Following his analysis, by contributing to unjust conditions of workers we
mean that the conduct of an agent or institution was causally relevant to
the unjust situation. In other words, it was a necessary condition in a set of
actual antecedent conditions that was sufficient for its occurrence. “A’s
conduct did not merely allow a causal sequence that had antecedently put
B under threat of acute deprivation to play out, but rather initiated, facili-
tated or sustained it.”193
A complete application of the principle of contribution to unjust work
conditions would require a detailed empirical investigation of activities
and interactions between actors within the global labor market and their
influence on the creation of unjust situations. Thus, for example, where
networks of production are involved, the ILO could determine whether
brands have pressured the other members of the network to violate the
law, either directly or indirectly.
These four principles of shared responsibility could serve as a guide-
line for allocating responsibility among actors—public or private—for
remedying the unjust labor conditions of workers across the globe. One
question that has yet to be answered is how much relative weight to give to
each of these principles. Scholars are divided on whether greater signifi-
cance should be given to one of the principles, such as the contribution
principle, for example.194
This Part presented the four principles for allocating shared responsi-
bility as abstract principles; it must be noted that their concrete application
depends on the context in which they are applied.195 In the following Part,
we will outline the way in which these principles can guide reforms within
the ILO’s supervisory system and facilitate the replacement of the tradi-
tional statist conception of responsibility underpinning the ILO with a new
conception of shared responsibility.
IV. APPLICATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ILO
The shared responsibility model presented in the previous Part should
be understood as a regulatory ideal in that it is clearly impractical to ex-
pect that it could be fully implemented in the near future. At the same
time, it could also represent an objective toward which the ILO should
aspire. The goal would be to narrow the discrepancy between the actors
that should be held morally responsible for providing workers core labor
rights and the actual assignment of legal responsibility by the ILO.
Realizing this goal would require significant reforms in the ILO’s op-
eration, the specifics of which should be worked out internally. In this
Part, we will offer several preliminary suggestions for such reforms, but
they will not amount to a complete blueprint for all the necessary changes.
193. Id.
194. Barry, supra note 192; MILLER, supra note 150, at 81-109. R
195. The allocation of shared responsibility depends not only on the circumstances
under which labor standards are violated and on the relationship betwee the various actors






      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 27 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL401.txt unknown Seq: 46  4-OCT-13 9:22
720 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 34:675
Our underlying assumption, as explicated below, is that the ILO already
embodies values that are close to the shared responsibility ideal, especially
relative to other international organizations. Thus, there is little need to
introduce radical changes to its current institutional design. A conscious
move toward an ideal of shared responsibility entails political will that is
currently not discernible in the ILO.196 By relying on the institutions and
procedures already implanted in the ILO, we hope to offer the necessary
inspiration for such a move.
What might the supervisory system look like under the ideal of shared
responsibility? Our proposal proceeds in two stages. The first stage is to
identify the potential actors that should be considered responsible for rem-
edying unjust labor conditions according to the four principles of shared
responsibility just defined in Part III. As we demonstrate, this process
leads to the allocation of responsibility for workers’ rights among key ac-
tors that are overlooked by the existing supervisory systems: (1) states
other than the state in whose territory the labor rights are violated and (2)
powerful TNCs that participate in global production chains. In the second
stage, we elaborate on the particular procedures within the supervisory
system that should be reformed for trans-border enforcement of labor
standards, both in the framework of the regular reporting procedure and
in the special complaints procedure.
A. Expanding the Scope of Actors Responsible for
International Labor Standards
The ILO identifies two types of violations of labor standards. One
type is legislative in nature, which we accordingly term “legal violations,”
namely, an inadequacy in the legal scheme in a given country. In such
cases, the territorial state clearly bears responsibility for the violation and
its amendment. There is, however, a second type of violation, which we
term “practice violations,” where workers’ rights are violated in practice.
In such cases, actors other than the territorial state may bear responsibility
for the violation. While the territorial state always bears some degree of
responsibility for violations within its borders, the ILO should not auto-
matically assume that other states or private employers are without re-
sponsibility. Indeed, in practice violation cases, the ILO should identify
and assign legal responsibility to key actors according to procedures that
we propose, shortly, as part of the reformed supervisory system.
In addition to identifying the responsible actors, the four principles of
responsibility can assist in determining how the responsibility should be
allocated among them. The principle of capacity would be applied by the
ILO in a way that resembles the operation of the traditional notion of
responsibility; however, the application of the other three principles (ben-
efit, connectedness, and contribution) would challenge this conception. In
196. See Mark Barenberg, Sustaining Workers’ Bargaining Power in an Age of Global-
ization, EPI BRIEFING PAPER NO. 246 (Econ. Pol’y Institute, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 9, 2009,
at 19, available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp246/; Guy Standing, The ILO: An Agency
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the paradigmatic case of a labor rights violation in a manufacturing factory
in a developing country that is part of a production network, where the
TNC headquarters are located in a developed country, the following ac-
tors could, in principle, be deemed responsible for remedying the unjust
labor conditions under the shared responsibility model: (a) the state in
whose territory the violation occurred; (b) the direct employer that vio-
lated the rights of his or her employees; (c) the brand or TNC; (d) addi-
tional actors who partake in the specific labor connection;197 (e) the state
in whose territory the highest level of management (brand) resides; and (f)
the workers whose rights were violated, when organized.198
Pragmatic considerations seem to imply that the ILO should focus on
several main candidates for sharing responsibility. For example, once a
supply or distribution chain is identified, the ILO should engage with the
most powerful player in the chain.199 Thus, the ILO could set a guideline
whereby for each production chain, it assigns responsibility only to the
brand and sets aside other smaller identifiable players.200 This could be
rationalized by an underlining assumption that it is usually the brands that
will be held responsible under all four principles of responsibility. It is also
important to note however, that the shared responsibility model does not
“reduce” the responsibility of the territorial state, which would remain the
key actor responsible for any violation within its territory. Others could, in
appropriate cases, merely share this responsibility.
The shared responsibility model implies assigning responsibility to
groups of actors that bear no responsibility for labor standards under the
current, statist-oriented supervisory system: first, to state actors other than
the territorial state for actions that occur outside of their jurisdiction and,
second, to private actors (for example, TNCs). This expansion of the scope
of actors that could bear responsibility for labor standards raises a set of
practical problems. To begin with, there is the threshold question of
whether there would be the political will to implement such reforms. This
issue is beyond the scope of this Article; suffice it to say that it has been
clearly noted in the past that the ILO suffers from political impasse.201
Moreover, the ILO would likely encounter legal and conceptual difficul-
197. These may be identified either in legal terms of employer-employee relations or in
substantial terms, as discussed above—those who participate in the production network.
198. “Indeed, the line that separates those who are included in the “thick labor connec-
tion” and thus bear special duties and commitments from those who are part of the broader
‘social connection’ is not clear-cut. For example, one may debate to what extent fashion de-
signers are part of the apparel industry ‘labor connection’ and therefore have greater respon-
sibility toward workers’ conditions.” Dahan, Lerner & Milman-Sivan, supra note 154, at 118 R
n.60. Our theoretical framework could, of course, be further refined and negotiated. In the
ILO context, however, pragmatic considerations would have to be weighed as well in drawing
the line between actors who are deemed responsible and those who are not.
199. Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 185, at 5. R
200. While this should be a general guideline, under specific circumstances, other actors
may be identified as bearers of responsibility for international labor standards, depending on
the specific context in which the violation occurred.
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ties in implementing this model of responsibility. States would be wary of
accepting responsibility for labor rights violations outside their jurisdiction
and of attributing responsibility to private bodies. Nevertheless, as the dis-
cussion below will illustrate, the path to overcoming these problems is
through notions and practices already prevalent in the existing interna-
tional labor regime.
1. State Responsibility Beyond Territorial Borders
The notion of states taking responsibility for labor standard violations
that occur outside their jurisdiction is not unprecedented in the ILO legal
scheme. The ILO has incorporated, for example, states’ obligations to co-
operate across borders in its 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Conven-
tion, which includes the obligation to take appropriate measures, including
by means of international agreements, to facilitate economic, social, and
other contacts and cooperation between indigenous and tribal peoples
across borders.202 In the past, the ILO has explicitly requested that gov-
ernments extend their jurisdiction beyond their territorial boundaries to
ensure compliance by even those nationals acting abroad.203 Thus, it
seems that the notion of holding states responsible for violations outside
their territory should not be dismissed out of hand, bearing in mind, of
course, that the capacity principle would preclude assigning responsibility
to any state unable to assist workers in a meaningful manner.
Recently, international law scholars have made similar proposals to
assign responsibility for rights violations by TNCs to the state where the
TNC’s management resides (its “home state” or “state of origin”).204
Some have suggested, for example, that the state of origin be held respon-
sible for human rights violations in cases where the corporation involved
performs governmental roles—with or without authorization—or when
the home state fails to apply the required standard of due diligence toward
the acts of the corporation.205
Moreover, assigning responsibility to states for violations occurring
beyond their territorial jurisdiction has the advantage of helping offset the
inequality between developing and developed states that prevails in the
ILO. This inequality begins with standard setting. Notwithstanding the for-
mal equality in voting rights, committee membership, and other proce-
dures, decision making in the ILO with respect to standard setting is
unequal in several ways. Even at the preliminary stage of replying to pre-
202. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
art. 32, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
203. Examples are the ILO Convention Concerning the Regulation of Written Con-
tracts of Employment of Indigenous Workers art. 19, June 27, 1939, 40 U.N.T.S. 281 (shelved),
and ILO, Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention, 1936, art. 24, C050, 20th Sess. (June
20, 1936) (shelved).
204. Sara L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of
Global Mining, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. &. Dev. L.J. 177, 194-201 (2008).
205. ALEXANDRA GATTO, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: OBLI-
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paratory questionnaires, the labor administrations in developing countries
do not have sufficient personnel to provide detailed responses.206 Moreo-
ver, at the norm-generation stage, there is great inequality in the capacity
of delegates from different member states to analyze the information re-
ceived in the questionnaires, draft appropriate and timely responses, and
benefit from the assistance of advisory staff. In addition, developing coun-
tries find that the size of their delegations to the annual Conference is not
large enough for them to have an impact on the various committees that
formulate standards.207 Developing countries lack the capacity for inde-
pendent, professional research and other means of gathering information
and thereby influencing the standard-setting process.208 The current sys-
tem of supervisory mechanisms—whereby the ILO assigns responsibility
only to those states on whose territory violations occur—intensifies this
inequality between developing and developed states because so many of
the violations occur in developing countries.209 Extending responsibility to
states that could assist in remedying these violations—for example, to the
states in which the brands reside—would be a more balanced representa-
tion of general responsibility for labor conditions. In this respect, our pro-
posed model of shared responsibility conforms better with the complex
reality of global economic and political interdependence than the ILO’s
current statist model of responsibility.
2. Private Actors’ Responsibility
Imposing responsibility on private entities could prove to be even
more controversial. Indeed, this would have been unheard of in the tradi-
tional international law that evolved in the first decades of the twentieth
century.210 In recent years, however, we have been witness to several seri-
206. See J.M. Servais, Flexibility and Rigidity in International Labour Standards, 125
INT’L LAB. REV. 193, 194 (1986).
207. Id.
208. The ILO has considered over the years methods of improving the equality of par-
ticipation of member states in the standard-setting process. For example, it has considered
proposals aimed at providing financial assistance to countries that cannot afford to send large
delegations to the Conference and at expanding the preparatory consultation on new instru-
ments at the regional level. See Servais, supra note 206, at 194-97, 194 n.3 (citing the Int’l R
Lab. Conf., June 6-26, 1984, Report of the Director General, 70th Sess. (1984), and ILO, Fol-
low-Up of Conference Discussion on International Labour Standards, at paras. 4-5, 16, Doc.
No. GB.228/4/2 (1984)). The obstacles to egalitarian, inclusive participation are enormously
compounded by the absence of representation for such groups as migrant workers, informal
workers, women, and rural workers. The most vulnerable workers, those whose interests are
not spoken for by national workers’ organizations, have no voice in the legislative process of
ILO standards.
209. See David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Trans-
national Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM.
J. INT’L L., 901, 901 (2003). Thus, for example, child labor is most prevalent in Asia, and
developing countries are adamant in their opposition to freedom of association. See, Clyde
Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. I.
INT’L ECON. L., 61, 74-76 (2001).
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ous attempts to internationalize the regulation of corporate social respon-
sibility. These efforts have been made by the United Nations in the
framework of the Global Compact in 2001. The Global Compact specifies
ten principles regarding the responsibilities of transnational companies in
the areas of human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption.211
In addition, in 2003, a five-member U.N. Working Group on the working
methods and activities of transnational corporations formulated its Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporation and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.212 The Norms were approved
by the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, but strong opposition from businesses and several states led to the
document’s rejection in 2004 by the Human Rights Council.213 In 2011,
however, the Human Rights Council endorsed The Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights drafted by John Ruggie, the former U.N. Sec-
retary General’s Special Representative on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations.214 This document, which seeks to guide trans-
national corporations on their responsibilities for human rights,215 outlines
the duty of the state to protect human rights, corporations’ responsibility
to respect human rights, and victims’ access to remedies. The violation of
human rights by TNCs is attributed to the limits of the state to protect
human rights due to what has been termed the “governance gap,” namely,
the declining ability of national governments to follow, regulate, and con-
strain the activities of corporate actors who have the capacity to move
from one jurisdiction to another, alongside the expansive power of mul-
tinational corporations and the weakened capabilities of the nation-state
in a globalized world.216 Because of the governance gap, states are unable
211. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 28. R
212. See Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., Comm. on Hum.
Rts., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, Commission,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). For an extensive analysis of the
Norms and their importance for the regulation of transnational corporations by international
law, see Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Na-
tions’ Norms of the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2005).
213. For a detailed historical description of the UN’s position on transnational corpora-
tions, see Deva Surya, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implications for
Companies, 9 EUR. CO. L. 101 (2012).
214. Guiding Principles, supra note 180; see Press Release, U.N. Off. High Comm’nr for R
Hum. Rts. [UNHCHR], New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights endorsed by
the UN Human Rights Council, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews
.aspx?NewsID=11164 (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
215. The Human Rights Council established a five-member Working Group for a pe-
riod of three years to promote the implementation of the Guiding Principles. Working Group
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises, UNHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnational
corporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
216. See Kate Macdonald, Re-thinking “Spheres of Responsibility”: Business, Human
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to act against TNCs that violate human rights, and in some cases unwilling,
for fear that such a policy would discourage foreign investment.217
In addition to these mechanisms developed by the United Nations,
other voluntary codes and systems have been introduced over the years,
one of the most prominent being the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, which were adopted by forty-two governments in May
2011.218 These guidelines cover business ethics on employment, human
rights, the environment, information disclosure, combating corruption,
and taxation.219 Signatory states commit to promoting these ethics among
multinational corporations operating in or from their territories.
The trend of increasing recognition of corporate responsibility for
human rights has not been limited to international soft law guiding princi-
ples, but has also found expression in national domestic legal systems. One
example is the 2010 adoption of the conflict minerals provision of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.220 Under this provision, the out-
217. The Guiding Principles rest on three constitutive pillars for protecting human
rights. The first pillar is a states’ duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
including business enterprises. It includes the obligation to ensure that all entities within a
state’s territory or control comply with human rights norms, which requires taking steps to
prevent, investigate, punish, and redress corporate human right abuses. Guiding Principles,
supra note 180, pt. I. The second pillar is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, R
independently of the state’s ability or willingness to fulfill its duty to protect human rights. Id.
pt. II. This responsibility supersedes national law that may govern a corporation’s conduct in
relation to human rights. Id. para. 11 cmt. To respect human rights essentially means not to
infringe on rights of others. Id. It requires that corporations act with due diligence and ad-
dress adverse impacts on human rights when they do occur. Id. para. 17. In the commentary
of principle 19 of the GP, Ruggie states,
Where a business enterprise cause or may cause an adverse human rights impact, it
should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent the impact, it should take the
necessary steps to cease or prevent the impact. Where a business enterprise con-
tributes or may contribute to an adverse human rights impact, it should take the
necessary steps to cease or prevent contribution and use its leverage to mitigate
any remaining impact to the greatest extent possible.
Id. at para. 19, cmt. Corporate responsibility to respect human rights refers to the “adverse
human rights impacts” corporations exert either “through their own activities” or as a result
of their business relationships with other parties. Id. para. 13. “‘[B]usiness relationships’ are
understood to include relationships with business partners, entities in [the corporation’s]
value chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations,
products, or services.” Id. para. 13 cmt. . The third pillar is access for victims of human rights
violations to judicial and nonjudicial remedies. Id. pt. III. While the Guiding Principles are
not intended to create binding legal obligations, they can be considered soft law that, over
time, can create customary international legal obligations or serve as a basis for treaties.
218. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 3 (2011) [hereinafter
OECD Guidelines], available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf; see Connie
De-La Vega, Amol Mehra & Alexandra Wong, Holding Business Accountable for Human
Rights Violations, HUMAN RIGHTS (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Int’l Pol’y Analysis, Berlin,
Ger.), July 2011, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08264.pdf.
219. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 218. R
220. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
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come of years of campaigning against human rights violations in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo (DRC), companies whose products rely on
certain minerals are required to file disclosures of the country of origin of
those minerals in their annual reporting to the SEC; where the origin of
the minerals is the DRC or unknown, the company will be required to file
an additional report explaining what due diligence it has exercised on its
supply chain.221
International labor law is often regarded as a prime example of a legal
regime that imposes legal and moral responsibilities on corporations.222
This is expressed, for example, in the manner in which some ILO conven-
tions are worded, placing direct duties on corporations.223 The ILO
adopted this approach mainly through the Tripartite Declaration of Princi-
ples Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy Declaration
(the MNE Declaration).224 The MNE Declaration sets forth principles to
which governments, employers, workers’ organizations, and multinational
enterprises are expected to voluntarily adhere in the fields of employment,
training, work and life conditions, and industrial relations.225 It reflects
agreement among the tripartite constituents of the ILO that “although
ILO standards are intended to apply to governments, the principles under-
lying these instruments can be applied to business as well.”226 The MNE
Declaration thus represents an initial starting point for a more stringent
scheme for assigning responsibility to private bodies. Similarly to our pro-
posed reform, the MNE Declaration has universal application, namely
that companies do not have to sign or otherwise formally commit to the
Declaration before their actions can be subject to scrutiny.227 The volun-
221. Id. For a discussion of this example and recent developments in the realm of cor-
porate responsibility, see Mark Taylor, Defining Compliance: Why Recent Developments in
Law and Policy Should Matter to the Corporate Accountability Movement, INT’L CORP. AC-
COUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, http://accountabilityroundtable.org/analysis-and-updates/de-
fining-compliance-why-recent-developments-in-law-and-policy-should-matter-to-the-
corporate-accountability-movement (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
222. Ratner, supra note 44, at 443, 478-79 (“This global recognition that the rights of R
employees create duties for corporations represent a stepping stone to an acceptance by
states that their rights of the citizenry can create other duties for corporations.”).
223. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working
Environment, art. 16.1, June 22, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 279.
224. ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy (3d ed. 2001).
225. The MNE Declaration further encourages all relevant actors to respect national
laws and regulations, to “give due consideration to local practices,” development priorities,
and social aims of host countries, and to respect international obligations including interna-
tional standards concerning human and labor rights. Id. at 3-4.
226. ILO, THE ILO MNES DECLARATION: WHAT’S IN IT FOR WORKERS? 4 (2011),
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_dialogue/-actrav/documents/publi-
cation/wcms_152797.pdf.
227. For criticism of the assumption that corporate social responsibility should be ap-
plied voluntarily, see, for example, Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforc-
ing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J.
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tary nature of the MNE Declaration and its supervisory mechanisms has
been only partially successful at best.228 Accordingly, the ILO recently de-
cided to bolster its supervision of the operations of multinational
enterprises.229
Proponents of strengthening corporate social responsibility and hold-
ing multinational enterprises more accountable have long argued that cor-
porate social responsibility codes should be transformed into legally
binding standards and that corporations could participate in protecting
human rights.230 The OECD’s experience with its own voluntary guide-
lines exemplifies this potential: its complaints procedure has on several
occasions led to the successful resolution of human rights disputes through
voluntary deliberation with the involved.231 The once widely-prevalent re-
sistance to linking human rights with MNE business practices has become
a thing of the past, with the increase in codes of conduct such as the
OECD guidelines and the U.N. Global Compact.232 In sum, the allocation
of responsibility to new actors in a manner that is more in line with the
global labor market is a novel idea, yet relies on notions and practices
228. The MNE Declaration is monitored by a periodic survey. The Office invites gov-
ernments to answer a detailed questionnaire on the effects of the instrument in their coun-
tries. About a third of the member states and their national most-representative employers’
and workers’ organizations provide partial information. In the 2000-2003 survey, only sixty-
two states responded. The responses received are analyzed and examined by the Governing
Body, and recommendations for action based on the findings are adopted by a decision of the
ILO Governing Body. An Ad Hoc Committee to reconsider the follow up mechanisms of the
MNE Declaration concluded that: “the follow-up mechanism in the form of a periodic survey
had not been viewed as a success in terms of becoming an operative tool. . . .” ILO Gov-
erning Body, Report of the Tripartite Ad Hoc Working Group on the Follow-up Mechanism
of the MNE Declaration, app. at para. 7, GB.313/POL/9(Rev.), 313th Sess. (Mar. 2004),
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/documents/meet-
ingdocument/wcms_173721.pdf.
229. In November 2009, the Governing Body decided to further concentrate the work
of the Office on the operations of multinational enterprises and their conformity with the
principles of the MNE Declaration. The Governing Body, moreover, decided that following
completion of this exercise, it would review its 1979 decision to report periodically on the
effect given to the MNE Declaration, in the light of the experience gained. More recently,
the Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises submitted a supplement to the update of
strategic priorities, outlining specific examples on initiatives to promote the MNE Declara-
tions. See Sub-Comm. on Multinational Enterprise, Governing Body, Update on Strategic
Priorities for 2010-11: Supplement, GB.310/MNE/2, 310th Sess. (Mar. 2011).
230. See, e.g., Stephen K. Pursey, The Trade Union View on the Implementation of
Codes of Conduct, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES 277 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
231. An example of such a complaint that was resolved to the satisfaction of all parties
involved is the 2005 complaint against Global Solutions Limited (Australia) Pty Ltd (GSL).
The complaint alleged that the company had breached the Human Rights and Consumer
Interest Provisions of the OECD Guidelines. The agreed mediation resulted in agreement as
to ways to keep operations within the framework of human rights. See COLLEEN FREEMAN,
CORNELIA HEYDENREICH & SERENA LILLYWHITE, OECD WATCH, GUIDE FOR THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES’ COMPLAINT PROCEDURE: LESSONS FROM
PAST NGOS COMPLAINTS 23 (2006), available at http://germanwatch.org/tw/oecd-gui06.pdf.
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already prevalent in the international labor law regime, including ILO
arrangements.
B. The ILO’s Supervisory System: Proposals for Reform
We now proceed to some initial concrete proposals for legal reforms
that would enable the incorporation of private bodies and nonterritorial
states into the ILO’s existing governance framework—its reporting system
and complaints procedures. We begin by pointing to the existing features
that already lay the groundwork for the implementation of the shared re-
sponsibility model. We then offer specific proposals for reforming the two
systems, each in turn, toward the implementation of the model in the ILO.
1. The Reporting System
Incorporating shared responsibility into the ILO’s reporting system
would entail a radical change in how the Committee of Experts operates.
Such a reform would be advanced by two general measures with respect to
the ILO’s supervisory process. First, the ILO would have to further har-
monize compliance with its core standards (or even with some other basic
minimum of standards) among its member states. This would require au-
thorizing the Organization to intensify supervision of its core standards
regardless of whether a member state has ratified the relevant standards,
thus narrowing states’ discretion regarding which standards legally bind
them to some agreed-upon minimum. Second, the shared responsibility
model would entail expanding and deepening the involvement of workers’
and employees’ organizations in the supervisory process. This enhanced
participation could require modification of the type of information re-
quested of the states in their ILO annual reports.
Traces of these two approaches can already be detected in the current
reporting system and the Committee of Experts’ mode of operation. These
initial manifestations of the shared responsibility model seem to indicate
that reform is imminent in the direction that we suggest. We begin, then,
by examining the features of the reporting system that already exhibit as-
pects of shared responsibility, followed by a discussion of our proposed
reforms.
a. The Reporting System: Initial Signs of a Shared
Responsibility Model
Elements of the ILO reporting system reflect a push toward harmoni-
zation of the Organization’s norms among its member states that shifts
away from the statist model in several respects. One such element is a
unique reporting requirement whereby member states are required to re-
port on the degree of their compliance with obligations set forth in con-
ventions they have yet to ratify. This reporting requirement departs from
the international law principle that states have absolute discretion in de-
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legal obligation, rather extraordinary in the international legal system,233
derives from Article 19 of the ILO Constitution, which empowers the ILO
to monitor unratified conventions and recommendations.234 This authority
can be understood as undermining states’ sovereignty for the purpose of
contending with problems of interstate cooperation and coordination, and
thus in line with the model of shared responsibility.235
This deviation from the principle of state sovereignty is manifested in
the reporting system in two central exceptions to the general rule that
states are legally bound only by standards they have ratified.236 The first
exceptional procedure is the General Survey.237 Every year, the GB
chooses an issue on which all member states are obligated to report,
whether or not they have ratified the conventions that address the subject
matter at hand. In their reports, the states are called upon to elaborate on
current practice in their jurisdiction regarding the issue at hand and on the
obstacles to ratification of the conventions. The General Survey creates a
worldwide overview of the issue, which is published in the General Survey
as a part of the Committee of Experts’ annual report.
Secondly, the ILO reporting duties impose certain procedures on
member states’ internal ratification process that may indicate movement
toward the greater harmonization of norms.238 Under the ILO Constitu-
tion, member states must submit any new instrument adopted by the Inter-
national Labor Conference to their relevant national political bodies for
serious consideration of ratification and/or implementation of the stan-
233. Laurence R. Helfer, Monitoring Compliance with Unratified Treaties: The ILO Ex-
perience, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2008, at 193, 195. The extent to which this authority
is exceptional is part of a long-standing debate over whether the nature of ILO conventions
resembles treaties or legal regulations. See, e.g., Maupain, supra note 30. R
234. See ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 19(7)iv. R
235. See generally Helfer, supra note 233. R
236. There are in fact three exceptions, the third being the procedures for monitoring
the 1998 declaration. See infra notes 249–255 and accompanying text. R
237. The General Survey is an “[e]xamination of law and practice in a particular subject
area,” of all member States, regardless of their ratification of the conventions that address
subject at hand, published in Report III (Part 1B) of the Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations. All the general surveys conducted from 1985
are available at General Surveys Since 1985, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/infor-
mation-resources-and-publications/WCMS_164145/ index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
238. Until about 1990, this obligation was complied with at a rate of about 80%. How-
ever, this rate has since dropped sharply, partly in relation to the new members in the ILO.
See THOMANN, supra note 4, at 76. However, this procedure has pressured at least some R
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dards set forth within.239 The states have one year240 to report that this
duty has been met and that the convention was brought before the compe-
tent legislative authority for approval.241 In addition, if the national legis-
lature has refused to ratify, the states are required to justify this refusal
and indicate whether the state intends to use alternative means for imple-
menting the relevant labor standards.242 This is an extraordinary and un-
precedented procedure, for states are requested to submit to their
legislature legal instruments that were not necessarily endorsed by their
own relevant authorities (it is even plausible that a state could have voted
against the adoption of the instrument by the ILO).243 This reporting obli-
gation, which raised legal difficulties when first introduced,244 represents a
further shift away from full and complete state sovereignty, toward the
international harmonization of norms and a departure, as such, from the
statist model.
Several aspects of the reporting system also embody the aspiration to
expand the scope of actors involved in the supervisory system. There is
explicit deviation from the statist model in Article 23 (II) of the ILO Con-
stitution, which requires all governmental reports to be communicated to
the national representative organizations, which in turn make their own
observations as to the factual situation on the ground.245 Moreover, the
ILO has recently deepened the involvement of its functional organizations
in its reporting system by assigning greater weight to their reports. In 2006,
the Governing Body established guidelines for the proper treatment of
comments received from employers’ and workers’ organizations concern-
ing the application of a ratified convention in a nonreporting year. These
guidelines are aimed at ensuring that the Committee of Experts will be
able to address serious violations of legal obligations, even in nonreporting
years. They provide that the Committee may request states to report
239. ILO, Memorandum Concerning the Obligation to Submit Conventions and Recom-
mendations to the Competent Authorities, at 4, GB.292/10, 292d Sess. (Mar. 1, 2005), available
at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/questionnaire/
wcms_087324.pdf; Comm. on Legal Issues and International Labor Standards, Governing
Body, Possible Improvements in the Standards Related Activities of the ILO: Proposals Re-
garding Submission to the Competent Authorities and the Representation Procedure, at 3,
GB292/LILS/1(Rev.), 291st Sess. (Mar. 2005), [hereinafter Possible Improvements], available
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb292/pdf/lils-1.pdf.
240. In extenuating circumstances, member states could extend this period to a maxi-
mum of eighteen months. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 19(5)(b), (6)(b). R
241. Id. art. 19(5)(c), 6(c).
242. Id. art. 19(5)(e), 6(d).
243. At its inception this procedure was described as innovative and bold. See INT’L
LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: THE FIRST DECADE 268-69
(1931) [hereinafter THE FIRST DECADE]. The submission of the instrument, however, does
not mean that it should be recommended: “The obligation to submit the instruments does not
imply any obligation to propose the ratification of Conventions or to accept the Recommen-
dations.” Possible Improvements, supra note 239, pt. III(b). R
244. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 243, at 270-71. R
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outside their regular cycle when employers’ or workers’ organizations
have directed its attention, via their comments, to severe violations of a
ratified convention. In fact, in 2009, the Governing Body extended the
reporting cycle on the fundamental and governing conventions from two
to three years,246 thereby enhancing the significance of comments pro-
vided by the functional organizations on nonreporting years, which now
would most likely inform a larger percentage of the Committee’s work.247
Certain elements of the functioning of both the CEACR and Confer-
ence Committee can be described as conforming to the shared responsibil-
ity model. The Conference Committee, which receives the CEACR’s
comments and reports, conducts comprehensive deliberations regarding
these reports, which reflect elements of the shared responsibility model in
that they engage all relevant parties. The determination of the Conference
Committee to conduct broadly inclusive deliberations is consistent with
the shared responsibility model and its emphasis on remedial responsibil-
ity and rectifying violations. Problem solving is best served by an inclusive
process, since when the key actors that bear responsibility for a particular
situation are present, they not only can be “named and shamed,” but,
more importantly, can assist in making progress toward remedying the sit-
uation. Currently, however, the deliberations of the Conference Commit-
tee do not materialize their potential fully, and amount to a naming-and-
shaming process.
Moreover, since 2005, the Conference Committee has stressed the link
between technical assistance and the standards-related activities of the su-
pervisory bodies, in a manner that is aligned with the notion of shared
responsibility. Thus, for example, the supervisory system will highlight
cases where technical assistance will be particularly helpful in ensuring
compliance with labor standards.248 This promotional focus follows an im-
plicit understanding that individual states should not always be held fully
246. Int’l Lab. Conf., 99th Sess., Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations, para. 77, (2010), available at http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_123424.pdf.
The Committee recalls that at its 77th Session (November-December 2006), it gave
guidance to the Office as to the procedure to be followed in determining the treat-
ment of comments received from employers and workers organizations concerning
the application of a ratified Convention in a nonreporting year. This year, the
Committee examined this procedure in light of the decision of the Governing
Body at its 306th Session (November 2009) to extend the cycle for the submission
of reports from two to three years for the fundamental and governance
Conventions.
Id.
247. There has been a recent rise in the number of reports by trade and employers’
organizations, as evidenced in the 2010 Committee of Experts’ report. In 2010, “the Commit-
tee received 705 comments (compared to 630 in the preceding year), 115 (compared to 57 in
the preceding year) of which were communicated by employers’ organizations and 590 (com-
pared to 573 in the preceding year) by workers’ organizations.” Id. at para. 72.
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responsible for their failure to comply and in fact are in need of external
help to act in accordance with their legal obligations.
Lastly, beyond the regular reporting system, the follow-up to the 1998
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was de-
signed to complement the ILO’s supervisory procedures in a strictly pro-
motional manner.249 Put differently, the follow-up was intended as a
means of identifying ways to assist governments in applying the core rights
regardless of the ratification of core conventions. This departure from the
requirement for state ratification in order to monitor the implementation
of norms demonstrates a move toward a more universal and transnational
model of responsibility. Similarly, the 2008 Declaration has several fea-
tures that are aligned with the notion of shared responsibility. It is the first
declaration to emphasize the role of both private and governmental enti-
ties in promoting and achieving the decent work agenda250 and thus may
be interpreted as implicitly encouraging assigning responsibility to private
entities as well as governmental ones. In addition, it has bolstered the four
core rights, establishing for the first time their position as a precondition
for economic development251 and, thus, their universal status. It is also
unique in its proactive rather than reactive and corrective focus.252
Initial signs of shared responsibility values can also be found in the
Implementation Plan of the 2008 Declaration. First, the Implementation
Plan calls for revisions in the reporting system that would allow for the
collection of more detailed data regarding labor rights violations.253 Sec-
ond, it calls for the creation of a partnership with nonstate entities, such as
multinational enterprises and global trade union networks.254 Third, it es-
tablishes tools for assessing the implementation of labor standards, such as
those constituting Decent Work.255
b. The Reporting System: Proposed Reforms Toward a Shared
Responsibility Model
How can the ILO progress beyond these initial stages toward a more
comprehensive model of shared responsibility? Most significantly, the
249. See ILO Declaration, supra note 1. R
250. The role of multinational enterprises is recognized in the Preamble, as the ILO
acknowledges the role of these enterprises in the interdependent economy and calls for de-
veloping new partnerships with them. In Part II A (v) of the text of the 2008 Declaration, this
call is even more concrete. ILO Declaration on Social Justice, supra note 30, at pt. II(A)(v). R
251. See Maupain, supra note 30, at 842. R
252. See id. at 834-35.
253. See, for example, the emphasis on research, information collection and sharing in,
Steering Grp. on the Follow-up to the Declaration (2008), Governing Body, Declaration on
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization: Preliminary Implementation Plan, paras. 32–36,
GB.303/SG/DECL/2, 303rd Sess. (Nov. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Implementation Plan], availa-
ble at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/documents/meetingdocu
ment/wcms_099851.pdf.
254. See id. para. 30.
255. The Plan proposes a pilot project in four countries as part of the incremental appli-
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CEACR should expand the scope of actors to which it assigns responsibil-
ity. Namely, when it detects practical labor rights violations, it should no
longer assume automatically that the sole actor responsible for the viola-
tion is the state in whose territory the violation occurred. Rather, it should
weigh assigning responsibility to other states as well as to private bodies,
by applying the four principles of responsibility allocation256 and making
an initial assessment of each actor’s degree of responsibility. Where states
other than the territorial state are involved, the assessment of their re-
sponsibility could proceed through regular procedures, such as direct con-
tact or observations, while analogous procedures could be instituted to
assist the CEACR in making a final assessment regarding private bodies.
In addition, the CEACR should expand the information it gathers by
revising its questionnaires to request information that goes significantly
beyond a description of the state’s legal reality and instead (or also) pro-
vides a picture of actual labor rights protection. For practical reasons, such
a reform to the Committee’s reporting procedures should be embarked on
with caution, as there has been a general decline in the rate of reports
being submitted257 and expanding the scope of required information could
exacerbate the problem. It is our view, however, that it is paramount that
the Committee receive a more comprehensive description of the actual
labor rights conditions in the member states. The ILO should thus con-
sider allowing the CEACR to receive reports directly from civic organiza-
tions and workers’ unions that are not necessarily the most representative
organizations.258 After concluding its assessment, the Committee could
summarize its initial findings in a report to the Conference Committee,
similarly to current practice.
Naturally, such a change to the operation of the CEACR would yield
parallel modifications to the functioning of the Conference Committee, as
they would have to address new actors, such as TNCs. The proceedings of
the Conference Committee should address directly all the actors identified
by the CEACR in every particular case. The Conference Committee’s con-
siderations for choosing cases for discussion and follow-up should thus be
transformed accordingly. Some amendments to its discussion procedures
will be indispensable, particularly in cases where one of the actors is a
private body. As noted, for such cases, the ILO could contemplate devel-
oping parallel proceedings to those currently applied to states. For exam-
ple, observations, when warranted, could also be published with regard to
private entities, as in the case of states. Allowing observations against
TNCs or other private employers would incentivize workers’ organizations
and civic organizations to include relevant information about violations
that targets particular employers.
256. See supra Part III.
257. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 69. Despite the general declining trend, the rate of R
reports received is rather decent compared with other international organizations. Id.
258. Again, the ability of the CEACR to examine such information should be consid-
ered. This suggestion should be implemented incrementally, as civil society often lacks the
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In addition, one expected outcome of the application of the shared
responsibility model would be that industrialized states would presumably
shoulder more responsibility than they currently do, particularly as origin
states. Such a development would impact the operation of the Conference
Committee in terms of how it chooses cases for discussion and follow-up
by the supervisory system. The Conference Committee currently compiles
a list of about twenty-five cases that seem to be rather randomly chosen.
This observation is not based on the cases left off of the list, but because
those that do make the list are selected based on geographic distribution
and other considerations. This has been in an effort to include more cases
relating to violations in industrialized countries.259 The shared responsibil-
ity model would reduce the need to arbitrarily choose industrialized coun-
tries, as these countries would, under the new model, bear more
responsibility for violations in which they are involved.
2. The Complaints System
a. The Complaints System: Initial Signs of a Shared
Responsibility Model
The ILO complaints process, like its reporting system, reflects the two
objectives described above: first, the need to broaden the legal conse-
quences of violating core standards regardless of whether the particular
state has ratified them; and second, the aspiration to expand and deepen
the participation of nonstate actors in the ILO’s supervisory process. In so
doing, this system, too, incorporates the beginnings of a shared responsi-
bility model.
The need to broaden the legal consequences of violating core stan-
dards is advanced in the framework of the ILO’s freedom of association
norm. This is manifested in the exceptional procedure that provides that
allegations of an infringement of freedom of association can be filed
against states that have not ratified the relevant convention. This proce-
dure was introduced in the 1950s and underscored at the time the unique
nature of freedom of association as enshrined in the ILO Constitution and
as a customary norm.260
Yet the ratification status of freedom of association conventions is not
without significance. In allegations of a severe violation by a member state
259. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 92. R
260. Nicolas Valticus, Once More about the ILO System of Supervision, in 1 TOWARDS
MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 106 (Niels Blokker &
Sam Muller eds., 1994). The ILO Constitution is the legal basis for this understanding of the
norm. The Preamble to the 1998 Declaration explicitly declares that:
all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an
obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect,
to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution,
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those
Conventions.
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that has ratified the relevant conventions, the Governing Body can refer
the matter to the FFCC261 to investigate the claim.262 In contrast, when
the alleged violation is by a nonratifying state, the state’s participation in
the inquiry is voluntary, for its explicit consent is necessary for the matter
to be referred to the FFCC.263
The second objective—the need to include nonstate actors in the su-
pervisory process—already finds expression in the representations proce-
dure. Indeed, any industrial organization (usually workers’ organizations)
can submit a representation, regardless of the organization’s size or na-
tional affiliation or whether it is a local, national, or international organi-
zation.264 The only requirement for qualifying as a complainant is that the
GB determines it to be an “industrial organization.” In order to prevent
any manipulation of the definition by the national state involved, the ILO
specifically provides that in determining an organization’s eligibility, the
Governing Body is not bound by definitions endorsed by the national au-
thorities of the state where the organization resides, but rather should
make an objective evaluation according to its own rules.265 The principle
of inclusive participation is further served by allowing international orga-
nizations that have affiliates with a direct interest in the alleged violation
to serve as complainants.266 This rather inclusive procedure opens up the
possibility of representations being submitted by regional organizations,
such as the Latin American Central of Workers (CLAT) and the Latin
American Federation of Trade Workers (FETRALCOS),267 and interna-
tional organizations, such as the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, which has in fact filed several representations.
261. See Freedom of Association Complaint Procedures, supra note 129, para. 3. The R
FFCC is composed of nine independent persons, who work in panels of three, similarly to the
composition of the Commission of Inquiry. See id. para. 7.
262. For the legal basis for inception of FFCC, see id. paras. 1-2.
263. NICOLAS VALTICOS & GERALDO VON POTOBSKY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW
297 (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 2d ed. 1995).
264. See Freedom of Association Complaint Procedures, supra note 129, paras. 31–35; R
Representations, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-interna
tional-labour-standards/representations/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
265. See Freedom of Association Complaint Procedures, supra note 129, paras. 32-35. R
266. Id. para. 31.
267. These organizations cooperated and alleged together a nonobservance by Vene-
zuela of the ILO Employment Policy Convention, 1964. The Latin American Central of
Workers (CLAT) had also filed representations alone, for example, submitting in 1997 a rep-
resentation alleging nonobservance by Uruguay of the ILO Occupational Safety and Health
Convention, 1981, and, in 1996, a representation alleging nonobservance by Costa Rica of the
ILO Employment Policy Convention, 1964. In 1995, it filed a representation alleging nonob-
servance by Peru of the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952, and a
representation alleging nonobservance by Paraguay of the ILO Minimum Wage-Fixing Ma-
chinery Convention, 1928. It also filed a representation alleging nonobservance by Nicaragua
of the ILO Protection of Wages Convention, 1949, the ILO Social Policy (Basic Aims and
Standards) Convention, 1962, and the ILO Employment Policy Convention, 1964. Represen-
tations (Art. 24), ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50010:0::NO::P50010_AR
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A further indication of the acceptance of the shared responsibility
model is that it is possible for several organizations to coordinate and file a
joint representation.268 In addition, industrial organizations are not re-
stricted to submitting representations only regarding violations that have
occurred in their own states, but rather regarding violations in any state;
they can even submit representations regarding several states in conjunc-
tion, something that has already been done in practice.269 Thus, for exam-
268. The World Federation of Trade Unions, for example, has participated significantly
in the ILO’s supervisory systems. For example, it filed a representation in 1976 alleging non-
observance of the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, by
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark; in 1978, it alleged
nonobservance of the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958,
by Czechoslovakia (CGT); in 1979, it alleged nonobservance by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many of the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, id.; in
1984, it again alleged failure by the Federal Republic of Germany to implement the ILO
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, a complaint that resulted
in a GB decision, in application of article 10 of the Standing Orders for the examination of
representations, to refer the matter to a commission of inquiry. See Comm’n of Inquiry Ap-
pointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO to Examine the Observance of the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), by the Federal
Republic of Germany, Rep., O.B. LXX, Series B, Supp. 1 (1987). In 1991, the Confederation
alleged nonobservance by Yugoslavia of the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupa-
tion) Convention, 1958; in 1994, it alleged nonobservance by Myanmar of the ILO Forced
Labour Convention, 1930; in 1996, it alleged nonobservance by France of the ILO Labour
Inspection Convention, 1947, and the ILO Social Policy (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Con-
vention, 1947. In 1983 and 1993, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
joined the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Swedish Confederation of Pro-
fessional Employees (TCO) to file representations alleging nonobservance by Sweden of the
ILO Employment Injury Benefits Convention, 1964. Representations (Art. 24), supra note
267. R
269. The two cases in which an organization filed a representation against several coun-
tries involved international transportation: in 1975, the Swedish Dockworkers’ Union filed a
representation against France, the Netherlands, and Poland alleging nonobservance by all
three of the Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) Convention, 1929 (No.
27); in 1996, the Association of Danish Sa Employees in the Air Transportation Business
filed a representation against Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom for the nonobservance of the Employment Policy Convention, 1964. Repre-
sentations (Art. 24), supra note 267. In addition, among the cases that were not withdrawn or R
deemed nonreceivable, several cases involved an industrial organization that filed represen-
tations against a state in whose territory it does not reside. Thus, for example, in 1991, the
Federation of Egyptian F12Trade Unions filed a representation against Iraq alleging nonob-
servance of the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Con-
vention, 1958 (No. 111), and the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962
(No. 118). In 1990, the National Confederation of Workers of Senegal filed a representation
against Mauritania alleging nonobservance by Mauritania of International Labour Conven-
tions Nos. 95, 102, 111, 118 and 122; in 2006, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
(TURK-IS) filed a representation against the Netherlands alleging nonobservance by the
Netherlands of the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118). In
1998, the General Confederation of Labour of Argentina (CGT) filed a representation
against Spain alleging nonobservance by Spain of the Migration for Employment Convention
(Revised), 1949 (No. 97), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
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ple, the representation procedure allows for a Turkish workers’ union to
allege a violation by the Dutch government toward Turkish workers who
worked in the Netherlands. These features of the representation proce-
dure, which usually go unnoticed, enable the ILO to address labor rights
violations that occur in the framework of cross-border economic activity.
It seems no coincidence that recent years have witnessed an increase in the
submission of representations.270
In sum, then, much in the same way as the reporting system, the com-
plaints system exhibits distinct signs of a shift toward a shared responsibil-
ity model. The implications of this shift, we will show below, can be
extended to other mechanisms of the ILO standard supervisory system.
b. The Complaints System: Proposed Reforms Toward a Shared
Responsibility Model
Incorporating TNCs and nonterritorial states into the ILO complaints
system as potential subjects of investigation would require adapting the
Commission of Inquiry’s procedures and, for cases of freedom of associa-
tion, those of the ad hoc committee.271 To fully integrate the shared re-
sponsibility model, where a state has not yet ratified core conventions, the
ILO would need to waive the requirement of state consent currently nec-
essary before the FFCC may initiate an investigation, as is the case with
the CFA procedure.272 The CFA’s current mandate to investigate cases
without the involved states’ consent, even if they have not ratified the rele-
vant conventions, should be extended to the other three core rights—the
right to be free of forced labor, the right to equality at work, and the right
to be free of child labor—a move that has been advocated by Bob Hepple,
for example.273 From a practical perspective, the CFA’s and FFCC’s ex-
isting procedures, with the necessary modifications, could serve as a model
in adapting the representations procedure and could also inform new
Commission of Inquiry procedures for initiating investigations regardless
of ratification status. In fact, the representations procedure already bor-
rowed procedural rules from the ILO legislative bodies that supervise the
freedom of association norm.274 Past experience suggests that a lack of
270. VALTICOS & POTOBSKY, supra note 263, at 108 (discussing how the representation R
procedure evolved in more recent years).
271. See supra Part II.
272. See supra Part II.
273. Bob Hepple, Does Law Matter? The Future of Binding Norms, in PROTECTING
LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: PRESENT AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVI-
SION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON THE 80TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE ILO COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 221, 229 (George P. Politakis ed., 2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_087817.pdf.
274. See the GB’s decision to accept the procedural rules that apply to cases of freedom
of association as guidelines that would assist in resolving disputes as to procedural quandaries
that relate to the procedure of representations under Article 24. See Possible Improvements,






      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 36 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL401.txt unknown Seq: 64  4-OCT-13 9:22
738 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 34:675
political will can be expected, however.275 The failure of the ILO to make
use of the ad-hoc procedure instituted in 1973 that allows investigations of
violations of the equality norm regardless of convention ratification status
suggests that the ILO continues to lack the resolve to implement the re-
quired reforms.276
A possible starting point for procedural reforms to further deepen the
participation of nonstate actors is the existing multiple party complaints
procedure.277 This procedure, too, however, should be modified to allow
the initiation of a complaint regardless of ratification status. One concern
that could arise, of course, is the possibility of abuse of the procedure.
How can the ILO ensure that the ability to file a complaint against a
nonterritorial state will not be abused or lead to a sharp increase of politi-
cally motivated complaints against states that are not significantly involved
in labor rights violations? A possible solution to this problem could be
found in the current mandates of the ILO supervisory bodies. These bod-
ies have been accorded discretion as to whether to receive or reject com-
plaints.278 Similar discretion could be applied to determine the
preliminary question of the responsibility of nonterritorial states according
to the four principles of shared responsibility. The supervisory bodies also
have ample experience dealing with complex matters. The CFA, for exam-
ple, requires that all complaints be submitted in writing with evidence to
support the allegations made therein.279 It is required to determine com-
plicated preliminary questions, such as whether the industrial organization
that submitted the complaint was qualified to do so. Accordingly, the CFA
is authorized to determine whether the complainant has a “direct interest”
in the case; in cases of complainants where the international organizations
lack consultative status with the ILO, the CFA must determine whether
the national affiliates of the particular organization are directly affected by
the allegations.280 Similar initial rules of receivability could be instituted
275. THOMANN, supra note 4, at 132. R
276. Id. at 131-32.
277. Examples are the complaints submitted concerning the observance by the Domini-
can Republic and Haiti of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), the Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), the Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), made by several workers’ delegates at the 67th Ses-
sion of the Conference. Comm’n of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution
of the ILO to Examine the Observance of Certain International Labour Conventions by the
Dominican Republic and Haiti with Respect to the Employment of Haitian Workers on the
Sugar Plantations of the Dominican Republic, Rep., O.B. LXVI, Series B Special Supp.
(1983).
278. The CFA, for example, may reject a complaint on several bases, including that the
complaining organization does not fall under any of the appropriate categories described
above, or that the case has already been decided and could also reopen a previous case. See
Freedom of Association Complaint Procedures, supra note 129, para. 38. Other bodies have R
also adopted rules of receivability. See, for example the receivability of representations, dis-
cussed above, supra note 112. R
279. See Freedom of Association Complaint Procedures, supra note 129, para. 40. R
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to determine whether nonterritorial states in question are prima facie ap-
propriate parties for investigation. The Commission of Inquiry has also
routinely applied its authority to request information from nonterritorial
states that were not directly under investigation.281
The Commission of Inquiry has also had experience with investigating
allegations made against private bodies, even though such bodies have
never been official subjects of investigation. When the Commission has
found a corporation to be “of a special position” with regard to the case, it
has not hesitated to investigate it. Thus, for example, in investigating a
complaint filed by Ghana against Portugal claiming a violation of the 1957
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105), the Commission of In-
quiry communicated with and investigated allegations against concerned
corporations.282 In this case, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Associa-
tion Ltd. was involved in recruiting workers from Mozambique to work in
mines in South Africa and thus was called upon by the Commission “to
send a duly accredited representative to give evidence at its second session
concerning the conditions of recruitment and employment of the labour
concerned.”283 Further, the complainants had pointed to particular private
enterprises in their allegations: the Diamond Company of Angola was ac-
cused of employing a quarter of its workers under forced labor, while the
Benguela Railway Company was accused of being partly maintained by
forced labor, as were various other European-owned plantations.284 The
Commission of Inquiry established appropriate procedures for investigat-
ing the companies, which cooperated with the investigation.285 The com-
panies provided information and sent representatives to the Commission’s
sessions to present relevant statements.286 In the case of most of the com-
panies deemed relevant to the investigation, the Commission also visited
the work sites and met and interviewed workers.287 This is one instance of
actual ILO experience that exemplifies the Organization’s ability to de-
velop procedures for investigating private entities as well as nonterritorial
states.
Implementing the shared responsibility model would also require that
all actors deemed responsible for labor rights violations be subject to the
ILO’s sanction scheme, including private bodies and nonterritorial states
in the appropriate circumstances. The wording of Article 33 of the ILO
Constitution, which sets forth the most severe sanctions the Organization
can impose, does not necessarily preclude the ILO from making such re-
forms. The article provides that the GB may recommend to the Interna-
281. Such authority is anchored in the ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 27. R
282. Portugal’s Report, supra note 78, paras. 25, 720. R
283. Id. para. 25.
284. Id. para. 23.
285. The general managers of the private companies concerned were invited and gave
evidence before the commission, as can be evidenced by the list of witnesses, see id. paras.
43-44.
286. Id.
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tional Labour Conference “such action as it may deem wise and expedient
to secure compliance.”288 There is nothing in this wording that rules out
sanctions against private bodies or sanctioning several countries in tan-
dem.289 On the one occasion that the ILO did invoke Article 33, in its
2000 resolution regarding Myanmar, it allowed the member states discre-
tion as to the nature of the measures to be taken against Myanmar.290
Moreover, as the Myanmar experience demonstrates, a more centralized
approach, where the particular steps members states should take against
the responsible actors are specified, is called for, rather than leaving it to
the states’ discretion.291
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have argued that the ILO should assign legal re-
sponsibility to remedy the unjust conditions of workers in the global labor
market not only to states in whose territory the labor rights violations oc-
curred. Rather, additional actors, both public and private, should also
share in the legal responsibility for remedying these conditions. Two such
actors in particular are generally viewed as dominant in the global econ-
omy: first, states in whose jurisdiction the particular violation transpired
(for example, states in which the brand or TNCs management resides)
and, second, powerful transnational corporations.
The central claim of our Article draws on a detailed analysis of ILO
internal mechanisms and structures, as well as a normative examination of
the principles of justice that should be applied in international labor law.
Taking an innovative interdisciplinary approach, which combines norma-
tive-philosophical and empirical-legalistic perspectives on international la-
bor standards, this Article has outlined a proposed reform of the ILO,
particularly its supervisory structure.
As demonstrated, the current ILO structure and procedures rest on an
outdated statist conception of responsibility for the protection of workers’
rights in the global labor market, under which nation-states are the sole
actors held responsible for enforcing a minimal level of labor standards
288. ILO Constitution, supra note 48, art. 33. R
289. The wording of Article 33 was amended in 1946, with the particular reference to
economic sanctions deleted. In addition, the authority to recommend sanctions was trans-
ferred from the independent Commission of Inquiry to the political GB. Economic sanctions,
however, are not ruled out as such. See Francis Maupain, The Settlement of Disputes within
the International Labour Office, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 284 (1999). Similarly, one could
argue that the wording of the article does not preclude sanctions against private bodies.
290. The 2000 resolution regarding Myanmar called upon the member states to review
“the relations that they may have with the member State concerned and take appropriate
measures to ensure that the said Member cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetu-
ate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labour referred to by the Commission of
Inquiry.” THOMANN, supra note 4, at 85. R
291. Only the European Union and the United States have imposed economic sanctions
against Myanmar, and these were mostly offset by the increased economic activities with
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within their territory. This statist model of responsibility has been embed-
ded in the ILO’s operational functions and tripartite structure from its ear-
liest days, among other things, evident in its norm-generating procedures
and, in particular, the supervisory system, including its complaints and re-
porting procedures. Due to a variety of economic, legal, and political de-
velopments in the global era, including the emergence of transnational
production chains, liberalization of trade, and the increased flow of mi-
grant workers, the global competition between states over capital and jobs
has dramatically intensified and the state’s ability to protect labor rights
within its territory diminished. International labor law scholars, recogniz-
ing the inadequacy of the existing national and international labor law sys-
tems for contending with the emerging difficulties of enforcing labor
standards in the global labor market, have called for a deterritorialization
of labor law. At the same time, political philosophers have underscored
the exploitive and unjust nature of existing labor relations in the global
labor market and argue for the creation of new institutions and rules to
correct these injustices.
Although the new global conditions and normative considerations of
global justice could, indeed, mandate a new set of institutional arrange-
ments, in this Article, we have focused on possible reforms to the ILO as
the central international institution explicitly striving to establish and
guarantee international labor standards. We have shown that the nation-
state, which traditionally bears the primary responsibility for worker’s
rights, is no longer suited to the task of generating and enforcing labor
standards by itself in the reality of the global market. Accordingly, the
crux of our argument is that the ILO should broaden the scope of actors
held responsible for upholding labor rights beyond the state in whose ter-
ritory labor rights are violated.
Under our proposed conception of shared responsibility for labor
rights, responsibility for remedying the unjust conditions of workers across
the globe is shared amongst various actors and institutions. We presented
four principles of responsibility allocation that should aid in determining
which additional actors should be held responsible for rectifying these con-
ditions: (1) the connectedness principle; (2) the capacity principle; (3) the
beneficiary principle; and (4) the contribution principle.
There is no simple algorithm for ranking the weight of each of the
principles in determining responsibility for the unjust state of affairs. For
example, it is clear that in order to assign an agent responsibility for recti-
fying an unjust situation, the agent must have the capacity to realize that
responsibility. In line with the notion that “ought” is implied by “is,” the
principle of capacity is a necessary precondition for assigning responsibil-
ity. There are others who assign special added weight to the principle of
contribution relative to the other principles,292 given its particular signifi-
cance in the legal context. In this Article, however, we espoused no partic-






      10/10/2013   11:12:26
34040-mil_34-4 Sheet No. 38 Side B      10/10/2013   11:12:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIL\34-4\MIL401.txt unknown Seq: 68  4-OCT-13 9:22
742 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 34:675
ular ordering of the principles,293 for we believe such an a priori ranking
to be impossible. Determining the relative weight of the four principles is
a practical task, contingent on the actual circumstances under considera-
tion and the role of the different agents connected to those circumstances.
In the context of responsibility for remedying unjust labor conditions in
the global labor market, allocating responsibility using the principles and
determining their relative weight is a task to be borne by the specific rele-
vant ILO bodies we discussed. This should rest on detailed empirical in-
vestigations and practical judgments that consider the best way to sustain
minimum labor standards.
As we demonstrated, the ILO bodies already have both the inherent
capacity and experience necessary for performing this daunting task, and
we suggested specific reforms to the Organization’s supervisory structure
to further facilitate this. These reforms, we showed, could be most effec-
tively implemented by building on the early foundations of the shared re-
sponsibility model already existing in the ILO’s reporting and complaints
systems.
Accordingly, we outlined proposals for reforming particular proce-
dures in these two systems. Our proposed principles for responsibility allo-
cation led us to conclude that additional actors can potentially be held
responsible for protecting labor rights, in addition to the territorial state
where the violation occurred, particularly the state within whose territory
the highest level of management (brand) resides and private actors such as
powerful transnational corporations.
The inclusion of additional public and private actors as bearers of re-
sponsibility for labor rights violations would likely be met with conceptual
objections as well as political resistance. However, as this Article illus-
trated, this proposed expansion would not be inconsistent with the ILO’s
legal scheme. Moreover, since implementing our shared responsibility
model in its entirety is clearly infeasible, it is intended as more of a regula-
tory ideal. Indeed, full and comprehensive implementation would likely
necessitate reform to the entire ILO operational and institutional struc-
ture, including its tripartite structure and its norm-generation procedures,
and not just its supervisory system. Our model could thus represent an
aspiration: toward decreasing the inconsistency between the actors that
are morally responsible for ensuring core labor rights for workers and
those actors who shoulder the legal responsibility to do so under the ILO’s
current approach. And finally, the proposed model of shared responsibil-
ity for remedying the dire conditions of workers around the world could
serve not only as a regulatory ideal and the basis for reform in the ILO.
Indeed, it is our hope that it can inspire other international and transna-
293. We recognize the additional work that is essential for aligning a conception of
responsibility that is not purely based on the principle of contribution with the normative
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tional institutions that promote cross-border labor standards, such as the
Free Trade Area of the Americas and the European Union.294
We acknowledge that additional conceptual and empirical study is
necessary, for example, with regard to the relative weight to be assigned to
each of the principles of responsibility allocation. Further practical consid-
erations should be taken into account in order to counter the political
pressure that will likely be brought to bear by powerful private actors such
as TNCs. Nevertheless, we maintain that our proposal for a new concep-
tion of shared responsibility based on the labor connection model is both
morally justified and ultimately practically plausible. Such a novel ap-
proach is critical today in order to overcome the gap between the global
consensus over the right of workers everywhere to a minimum level of
labor standards, on the one hand, and the limited ability of both national
and transnational institutions to regulate and enforce that right in present
times.
294. In general, the need to replace a statist, or state-centric, approach to international
institutions is recognized by various scholars. See, e.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 7. R
